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This thesis examines and analyzes the unique aspects of environmental 
remediation and the different contracting methods used by the DoD to outsource its 
environmental contracting needs. The analysis was conducted using archival and 
opinion research to define the unique qualities associated with environmental 
remediation and the individual Service's contracting methods. The research revealed 
that legislative requirements are numerous and a majority of the environmental 
remediation requirements are unclear in nature. The Navy's choice of the Compre-
hensive Long-Term Environmental Action Navy (CLEAN) and the Remedial Action 
Contract (RAC) and the Army's choice of the Total Environmental Remediation 
Contract (TERC) are compared and evaluated. This evaluation looks at the 
advantages and disadvantages in their application. The researcher's analysis of the 
data determined that the Army's TERC contract is the more efficient environmental 
contracting method. With the ultimate objective of providing an environmental 
contracting method that would enhance an integrated single face to industry it is 
recommended that the Army's TERC contracting method be adopted for use 
throughout the DoD. 
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Without question, environmental considerations have become and will 
continue to be an area of growing concern for the Department of Defense (DoD). It 
is only within the recent past that people have developed a concern for the long term 
effects hazardous waste material has on the environment. No longer able to rely on 
sovereign immunity, DoD is now being mandated not only to stop the contamination 
of the environment but to cleanup all previously contaminated sites. 
The present climate that the DoD operates in stresses jointness, integration, and 
a single face to industry. The present DoD environmental contracting atmosphere 
achieves none of the above objectives. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The contracting world is one of the most carefully watched and scrutinized 
processes in which the military is involved. One of the world's closest competitors 
for attention is environmental issues and concerns. Pair these two topics together and 
you have entered a highly sensitive area of environmental contracting. Environmental 
cleanup technology is as fast paced as the computer industry with new procedures 
popping up everywhere. [Ref. 1] Uncle Sam is usually left with the problem of 
which process will get the Government the most for its dollar. Considering the fiscal 
1 
constraint in which the military perennially operates, it is a small wonder this topic 
is so closely watched. 
Not too long ago environmental concerns were almost nonexistent. Plastics 
disposal, ozone layer and toxic spills were not household words. Only in the recent 
past have communities been concerned about the long term effects of the way 
business was being conducted and the effect it was having on our environment. Even 
more recently Federal and state regulations have been able to hold the military 
Services' feet to the fire. For many years the military has hidden behind its sovereign 
immunity and has been able to avoid the countless number of Federal and state 
statues. 
Environmental concerns have become and will continue to be a painful area 
of growing problems and growing pains for the DoD. The military is now feeling the 
effects and incurring the expense of having done business the wrong way for so many 
years. Some of the mistakes and misgivings are seeping into areas outside military 
bases and have gotten the attention of the residing communities. [Ref. 2] At a time 
when taxes are high and money is tight, the military is even more obligated to show 
the tax paying public that it is not causing more harm than good. The continuing 
reductions in the defense budget, coupled with the corresponding base closures and 
land turnovers, has focused attention on the importance of site remediation. This 
remediation needs to be done right the first time. 
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One would have difficulty finding anyone who would argue that the restoration 
costs are not and will not continue to be staggering. Environmental compliance is by 
far the largest and most expensive issue on most DoD installations. [Ref. 3] There 
is no current figure available to estimate the dollar value for the cleanup of these sites, 
although there have been estimates in the hundreds of billions. The environmental 
restoration mission has grown threefold between 1990 and 1994. [Ref. 4:p. 3] 
As of 1994, the Defense Department has annually generated over 500,000 tons 
of hazardous waste and has over 20,000 contaminated sites on 2,000 DoD 
installations. [Ref. 5] 
Environmental restoration on such a massive scale is not a simple task. 
Throwing money at restoration problems is not the only ingredient needed. As 
representative Richard Ray, chairman on the Environmental Restoration Panel of the 
House Armed Services Committee said, "DoD needs a balanced approach to waste 
cleanup and minimization." He suggests an approach for cleanup of environmental 
problems generated over the past several decades which should involve common 
sense, fiscal responsibility and accountability. [Ref. 6] 
Environmental restoration encompasses much more than the actual cleanup of 
the site. The cleanup itself is often the quickest part of the process. The larger 
problem is defining the scope of work (SOW), designing the cleanup procedures and 
getting the design specifications through the immense regulatory process. The time 
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required to get some of the more complex projects completed can be up to five years. 
So it is obvious that there is much more involved in environmental restoration than 
simply contracting for the actual cleanup. [Ref. 7] 
This thesis delves into the difficulties involved with environmental contracting. 
The rapidly changing environmental restoration world provides a manager many 
different scenarios and problems. One of the difficult problems with environmental 
contracting is matching the correct contract type with the environmental restoration 
task at hand. It is also often very difficult and/or expensive to accurately define the 
scope of work. It may be easy to identify that a site is contaminated but before an 
accurate scope of work can be written basic but often difficult questions must be 
answered, such as the identification of the contaminate and the amount to be removed. 
Often these questions cannot be answered without extensive preliminary research or 
until the task of the restoration is near completion. 
In order to accurately define the scope of a cleanup, extensive soil sampling 
and analysis would have to be carried out. These tests will be both expensive and 
time consuming. Even after extensive testing, there is no guarantee that some new 
chemical will not be discovered once the remedial action commences. [Ref. 7] 
Another problem or issue is the constantly changing legislation. Over the last 
decade, the Navy has gone from being able to rely on sovereign immunity to being 
under the jurisdiction of all Federal and state regulations. Even the military must now 
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comply with these regulations. Old regulations have been made more strict, and new 
regulations have put further constraints on how one can conduct environmental 
cleanups. This constantly changing environmental legislation and regulatory climate 
also make it difficult to accurately estimate cleanup cost during the restoration 
process. If regulations change halfway through a study or an actual cleanup, work 
may have to be stopped and redone in order to meet the new requirements. 
Not only can the regulations themselves change but also the interpretation of 
the regulations. Many of the environmental regulatory personnel are constantly 
rotating. It is essential to get the state and local environmental regulatory personnels' 
approval prior to their departure because their replacement may interpret regulations 
differently. It is especially important to get approval if it is a prototype procedure 
where there was no previous use of this method. One could spend countless man-
hours and energy developing a design specification or statement of work just to have 
it rejected. One may even run into the situation where one individual approved a 
procedure or project previously and someone else from the same office may have a 
different interpretation of the regulations as it goes up their chain of command. [Ref. 
8] 
Much of the change in regulatory requirements is the result of rapid 
improvement. Legislation becomes stricter as the improvements in the techniques of 
environmental restoration appear. Technological advancements in environmental 
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restoration cleanup procedures are continually developing and improving. Improved 
measuring techniques have enabled contractors to detect hydro-carbons for example, 
at previously unheard of lower levels. These improved measuring techniques have 
greatly enhanced the contractor's ability to address a problem. The contractor can 
now identify what it is and approximately how much there is to remove. As in any 
new area of research, the successful contractors will be those who are innovative and 
aggressive in implementing new information and technique into their restoration 
procedures. 
As in any market, the choice of what type of contractual arrangement to 
execute is not always clear. There are circumstances where the proper contract type 
is easily identified. One example could be disposal of the bottom sludge of a fuel 
tank. If one knows what the material is that needs to be removed and there are no 
time constraints, the requirement can be accurately defined. There are plenty of 
responsive and responsible offerors who could perform this effort and price can be the 
determining factor for the source selection. This scenario would allow one to use the 
sealed-bid method resulting in either a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) or a fixed-price with 
economic price adjustment (FPE) contract. [Ref. 9:pp. 288-289] 
Unfortunately the above simple scenario is relatively rare, as the uncertainties 
and possible contingencies in environmental restoration are numerous. The exact 
nature, extent of work required, regulatory requirements and technologies available, 
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often cannot be predicted at the time of contracting. There reaches a point when the 
cost of identifYing and correcting uncertainties becomes too great and economically 
unfeasible. At this point, it is better to leave the contract less precise and reimburse 
the contractor for costs after the uncertainties are resolved. The above example is 
precisely what a cost-type or cost-reimbursement contract achieves and this is 
predominately what DoD has decided to use. 
C. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis investigates the challenges faced by DoD in the field of 
Environmental Contracting. The title ofthe thesis is: Consistency in Department of 
Defense Environmental Contracting. 
1. Primary Question 
This thesis investigates why different branches ofthe Service within the DoD 
are using different contract methods for their environmental restoration contracts. 
The primary question this thesis will attempt to answer is: What is the most feasible 
contracting method for administering environmental contracting? 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
To answer the primary question listed above, it will be necessary to address the 
following subsidiary questions: 
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a. What contracting methods are actually being used by DoD? 
b. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each of these contracting 
methods? 
c. What are the possibilities that partnering should be or has been 
implemented in DoD environmental restoration contracting? 
d. Is there a single established contract type that all branches of the 
Service can use to provide an integrated single face to industry? 
e. To what extent should guidance regarding the contracting of 
environmental restoration be implemented into the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)? 
D. SCOPE 
The unique nature of environmental contracting explains why less complex 
contracting mechanisms are not always suitable for environmental restoration. The 
methods of environmental contracting used by each DoD branch of Service are 
assessed in this research and each method's advantages and disadvantages are 
identified with a primary focus on the Navy's and Army's environmental programs. 
It may not be possible to determine if one method of environmental contracting can 
satisfY all circumstances. The correct answer may require a combination of present 
methods of environmental contracting. 
Through these assessments of present DoD contracting methods, the 
development of a single best model is feasible. A policy or statuary limitation is 




This thesis research was conducted through the use of interviews with Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NA VFAC) personnel and other Services' 
equivalent. The interviews were directed at what the present environmental 
contracting climate is like. What different contracting methods are used, and what are 
the advantages and disadvantages of these methods. Through the use of a variety of 
references and a review of the current and historical published legislation and 
doctrine, DoD instructions were used in an attempt to answer the above mentioned 
questions. No statistical or numerical data are used. 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Given the dollars involved and the sensitivity of environmental restoration, it 
should be obvious that an extremely effective plan of attack is needed. This thesis 
provides the justification and insight needed to make sound decisions concerning this 
plan and the actions required to achieve it. 
Ultimately this thesis benefits DoD and possibly every Federal Government 
Department and Agency. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This section briefly describes the organization and format of this thesis. 
Chapter II .provides a picture of the unique problems affecting environmental 
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contracting. It begins by describing what contract types have previously been used 
by DoD in environmental restoration. This is followed by a brief description of the 
special idiosyncrasies of environmental cleanups. Next, the chapter concludes with 
the unique features and contract types involved with environmental cleanup. 
Chapter III explores the methods presently employed by DoD. It begins by 
describing the various regulations and statues that have shaped the present climate 
that environmental contractors operate in. This is followed by the various stages of 
the remediation process. Next, the chapter provides a detailed explanation of the 
contracting methods used by the Navy and Army. The chapter concludes with a brief 
description on how the Air Force administers environmental contracts. 
Chapter IV explains the advantages and disadvantages of the Navy's and 
Army's contracting methods. Chapter V analyzes the facts, opinions and associated 
interpretations of the material provided in the four previous chapters. The analysis 
examines the contracting methods used by the Navy and the Army. 
Chapter VI furnishes independent conclusions drawn from the researcher's 
analysis. The researcher provides several recommendations that will allow the DoD 
to provide a "single face" to industry with regard to environmental contracting. This 
chapter also provides answers to the primary and subsidiary research questions. The 
thesis concludes by providing suggestions for further research related to 
environmental contracting. 
10 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION UNIQUE PROBLEMS 
A. ENVIRONMENTALAREA 
Traditionally, firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts have been used by DoD to 
accomplish most of the responsibilities it is assigned. Some of these responsibilities 
include the construction of new facilities through the Military Construction 
(MILCON) program and the maintenance ofNaval installations and the facilities on 
them. Cost-reimbursement contracts are used but they comprised only a fraction of 
the contract types. [Ref. I O:p. 28] 
The cleaning up of environmental problems has now been added to DoD's list 
of new responsibilities and requirements. This addition of the environmental 
restoration problem and its associated idiosyncrasies have required NA VF AC to look 
into contracting mechanisms different from those favored in the past. Many people 
have looked at the environmental remediation program as a simple construction 
problem. This would lead one to conclude that the best contracting mechanism would 
be the traditional FFP contract. While environmental contract cleanups include many 
activities which are similar to construction contracting, there are also several features 
which make environmental contracting very unique. 
B. SPECIAL IDIOSYNCRASIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP 
The difference between environmental contracting and standard construction 
projects with which DoD has historically dealt can be attributed to four unique 
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features: new technology, uncertainties in the scope of work, changes in regulations 
and different degrees of enforcement and areas emphasized. Each of these four 
unique features is investigated here. 
1. New Technology 
Remediation technology is continually developing and improving. As new 
information and techniques become available, the successful contractors will be those 
who are innovative and aggressive in implementing these items. Technological 
advancements can also greatly assist in the actual cleanup effort. [Ref. 7] 
As the ability to measure smaller and smaller quantities of toxic materials 
increases, the standards within the regulations often change to make this the new 
requirement for cleanup. Much of the change in regulatory requirements is the result 
of the rapid improvement in measurement technology in the area of toxic waste. 
2. Uncertainties in the Scope of Work 
The inability to defme the scope of work is one of the most difficult problems 
when dealing with environmental restoration. [Ref. 7] This is caused by the intrinsic 
uncertainties associated with toxic contamination. It is relatively easy to determine 
that a site is contaminated, but determining the extent of the contamination is another 
matter. Many toxic sites are either buried dumps or areas where some liquid 
contaminate has seeped or migrated through the ground. In these cases, the area 
requiring remedial action is at least partially underground. It is difficult to determine 
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the nature, concentration, and extent of this underground contamination until it is 
actually excavated. [Ref. 7] Also, a dump site may contain dozens of different toxic 
materials, each of which has to be cleaned up using different methods. To determine 
which of these materials exist is usually difficult and expensive until the contractor 
actually confronts them during the clean-up segment of the project. [Ref. 7] 
Repeated and extensive soil sampling and analysis have to be carried out in 
order to accurately define the scope of a cleanup. [Ref. 7] These tests require 
considerable delays and are expensive. Even after extensive testing, there is no 
guarantee that some new material or migration path will not be discovered once the 
remedial action starts. The nature of the uncertainties in the environmental restoration 
area are unknown, but their presence is a common feature of environmental 
contracting. [Ref. 7] 
The removal and cleanup of underground storage tanks are a good example of 
the uncertainties involved in environmental restoration. Thousands of these tanks, 
many over 50 years old, exist on Government installations. [Ref. 7] Often, it is 
difficult to determine if the tanks are leaking or even what was originally stored in 
them. Borings can be taken in the surrounding soil to see if it is contaminated, but the 
results of these borings can only give a very rough idea of the extent of the 
contamination. The problem is that the migration of leaking toxins from an 
underground tank will take an unpredictable path based on the makeup of the soil and 
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material under the surface. [Ref. 7] Another problem is that old underground tanks 
sometimes disintegrate as they are lifted out of the ground. There is no way to 
determine if disintegration will occur until the tank is actually removed. For these 
reasons, it is often impossible to define the exact scope of a tank cleanup until the job 
is well underway. [Ref. 7] 
The underground tank problem is similar to most areas in environmental 
restoration in that it is impossible to define the scope and level-of-effort required until 
the job is actually complete. From above ground, sites can look very similar. What 
is of interest, however, is located underground. This points out the problem faced in 
defining the scope of environmental restoration projects. [Ref. 7] 
3. Changes in Regulations 
The changing regulations covering the execution of environmental contracting 
have been transforming at a rapid pace. Within this decade, the Navy has gone from 
being able to rely on sovereign immunity to being under the jurisdiction of all 
Federal, state, and local environmental regulations. [Ref. 11] Even as DoD has had 
to comply with these regulations, the regulations themselves have changed. Old 
regulations have been made more stringent, and new regulations have been 
implemented which put more constraints on when, how, and to what extent toxic sites 
must be cleaned up. [Ref. 11] If regulations change halfway through a study or an 
actual cleanup, work may have to be stopped and redone in order to meet the new 
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requirements. The constantly changing environmental legislation and regulatory 
climate also makes it difficult to accurately estimate costs during the restoration 
process. [Ref. 7] 
4. Different Degrees of Enforcement and Areas Emphasized 
Regulators may require two toxic sites, similar in many ways but located in 
different areas, to be cleaned up to different standards based on the location of the 
site. [Ref. 11] One would expect a populated site in Orange County or San Diego, 
to be cleaned up more completely than a similar site located in Fallon, NV. However, 
intangibles like this are impossible to be included in a contract. [Ref. 10:p. 32] 
Within a local EPA office, certain individuals will have different backgrounds 
and different levels of expertise. One regulator might have a background in water 
quality and therefore stress that aspect of an environmental cleanup plan. This is the 
reason that even within the same organization and geographic area, individual 
regulators will have different personalities and emphasize and require different items. 
[Ref. 11] The regulator at the next desk may have a background in soils, and 
emphasize that area while almost ignoring the water quality aspects of the job. There 
is no way of predicting which regulator will review and approve any particular plan 
or design. Since these regulators have the authority to reject proposed alternatives or 
require unexpected revisions, it is important to recognize the uncertainty they 
introduce. This again, however, is an intangible which is difficult to predict and very 
hard to put in an environmental contract. [Ref. 7] 
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C. UNIQUE FEATURES AND CONTRACT TYPES 
The four features raised above highlight some of the major differences between 
typical construction and environmental restoration work. All four represent some 
form of uncertainty which makes it very difficult to accurately estimate costs. It is 
even difficult to estimate the level-of-effort that will be required. 
The possible contingencies and ambiguity in environmental contracting are 
many. The exact nature, extent of work required, regulatory requirements and 
technologies available cannot be predicted at the time of contracting. The cost of 
trying to anticipate each one of these items and including it in the contract would be 
prohibitive. There is a point where the uncertainties are so great, and the probability 
of any particular event so small, that it is better to leave the contract vague and agree 
to price after the uncertainties are resolved. [Ref. 12] This is precisely how a cost-
reimbursement contract is designed to operate. 
If a FFP contract was used, the contractor would assume the entire cost risk of 
performance. He would, therefore, base his estimate on a worst case scenario and bid 
accordingly. The bid price would reflect a huge risk premium to compensate the 
contractor for assuming the cost risk of performance. This would not be a problem 
if using a cost-reimbursement contract because the Government would pay for only 
the level-of-effort actually required. Only those uncertainties, contingencies, and 
regulations which are actually encountered or required will be included in the contract 
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price. This should result in lower costs under a cost-reimbursement contract, as 
compared to FFP, because possible contingencies will not be included in a bid, and 
will not be included in the contract price unless they are actually encountered. 
It has already been established that occasionally uncertainties cannot be 
determined when writing an environmental contract, and would subsequently have to 
be left out. [Ref. 7] This would mean that a contract modification would have to be 
negotiated each time an uncertainty or changed condition was encountered. The large 
number of contract modifications is a significant drawback in using a FFP contract 
for environmental restoration. [Ref. lO:p. 35] 
There are additional disadvantages associated with contract modification. 
Three additional prominent detriments are increased contract cost, extended contract 
schedule and the added contract administration costs. [Ref. lO:p. 35] These are 
extremely time consuming for both the Government and the contractor. Work is often 
stopped until the problem area can be investigated, the scope and price negotiated, 
and direction provided to the contractor. This takes administrative effort and can 
substantially delay a project until the contract is officially modified by someone with 
the proper authority. 
Lack of competition, is another serious problem caused by contract 
modifications. Fixed-price contracts are more sensitive to modifications. When an 
unforseen site condition surfaces after contract award, the contractor is the sole source 
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for resolving the problem. This can lead to many concerns, one of the most serious 
being that the contractor no longer has any motivation to provide competitive prices 
for the work covered by the modification. The problems associated with contract 
modifications must be seriously considered, especially in the environmental 
restoration field, where there is little question there will be unforseen conditions 
encountered. [Ref. IO:p. 36] 
One of the advantages of a cost-reimbursement contract is that if uncertainties 
do surface, the contractor can be given immediate direction on how to correct the 
problem. For this reason the administrative, financial, and time costs of a contract 
modification can be avoided and progress does not need to be stopped. 
Of course one must keep in mind the preference for a FFP contract. If properly 
used the FFP contract is less of an administrative burden and the seller must deliver 
an end product vice a level-of-effort on the cost-reimbursement contracts. [Ref. 9:p. 
289] 
The courts are full of claims filed against the Government under FFP contracts. 
FFP contracts consistently comprise approximately 80 percent of all contract types 
submitted for claim with the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). 
[Ref. 13] One of the leading contract issues in these claims involves the Changes 
clause. This is the same clause that would most likely be used whenever uncertainties 
were encountered during the environmental restoration process. The use of a FFP 
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contract would not only increase the num,ber of contract modifications, it would also 
increase the number of contractor claims. 
Cost-reimbursement contracts, on the other hand, are less likely to result in 
litigation. Since the Government agrees from the start to pay all allowable costs 
incurred, there is no need for the contractor to make claims for payment. It is easy to 
see how an area as ambiguous as environmental restoration would generate an even 
greater number of claims if a FFP contract was used. 
Flexibility is one of the attractive features of a cost-reimbursement contract. 
For example, if regulations changed, as they have been, a cost-reimbursement contract 
would allow the contractor to immediately, and with minimal cost, redirect his effort 
towards satisfying the new regulations as long as it is still within the scope of the 
work. In contrast, if a FFP contract were used, the Government would still pay for 
any new requirements, as well as the contract administrative costs of modifications. 
[Ref. IO:pp. 36-37] 
With cost-type contracts the Government could encourage, or even direct, the 
contractor to be innovative with these new technologies. [Ref. 8] This is a definite 
advantages given the rapid improvement in remediation technology. If the entire cost 
risk of performance rests on the contractor, as with FFP contracts, he will be hesitant 
to experiment with new technologies until they actually have been proven. Lack of 
innovation will be detrimental to the Government in the long run. 
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There are disadvantages to using cost-type contracts. One disadvantage is the 
fact that a cost-reimbursement contract does not require the delivery of a product or 
service. [Ref. 9:p 289] Performance is based on level-of-effort vice a tangible 
product or service. The contractor is not a guarantor of successful performance of the 
requirement set forth in the statement of work. For this reason the level of 
accountability is significantly reduced and the Government assumes most of the 
financial risk of nonperformance. [Ref. 14:p. 319] 
Cost-type contracts are more expensive to administer than a FFP because the 
audit requirements and oversight activities are increased. To accomplish these 
requirements, additional personnel are needed to perform cost and technical reviews. 
Adequate contractor accounting systems must also be in place to verify the costs 
incurred. [Ref. 15] 
D. CONTRACT TYPE CONCLUSIONS 
In situations with significant uncertainties, a FFP contract would not be 
appropriate. The use of some form of cost-reimbursement contract is clearly 
warranted, due to the uncertain scope and price conditions inherent in environmental 
restoration, especially through the design phase. 
If a FFP contract was used in this situation, the scope of work could be written 
in one of two ways. It would have either a scope of work so broad that the contractor 
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would be responsible for all uncertainties, or a scope of work which ignored them 
entirely. If the broad scope of work was used, the bids submitted would reflect many, 
if not all, of the uncertainties which might be encountered. The contractors will 
submit bids based on the worst case scenario so all contingencies are covered. [Ref. 
16] Since rarely would all these contingencies take place on one job, the 
Government inadvertently overpays for the amount of the contingencies that did not 
occur. 
If the second option was used, the Government would have to pay for only 
those uncertainties which did actually surface. Each one, however, could possibly 
result in its own contract modification. This is an expensive and inefficient method 
of contracting, wasting scarce funds and precious man-hours on the additional 
contract administration. 
The underground, regulatory, and technological uncertainties of the environ-
mental area make it a perfect candidate for the cost-reimbursement contract. This is 
an area where the Government should assume the cost risk of performance. Use of 
a cost-reimbursement contract in this area would in the long run, speed up the cleanup 
effort and be more cost efficient. 
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E. SUMMARY 
As will be evident in Chapter III, the cost-reimbursement contract type is the 
avenue both the Army and Navy have taken with their environmental restoration 
contracting. Chapter III explains, in detail, the make up of the Navy's Comprehensive 
Long-Term Environmental Action Navy (CLEAN) contracts, their Remedial Action 
Contracts (RAC) and the Army's Total Environmental Restoration Contracts (TERC). 
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III. PRESENT CONTRACTING METHODS EMPLOYED 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter provides the reader an overview of various environmental 
regulations and statues, as well as DoD programs for the investigation of hazardous 
waste sites. The chapter also provides the reader an explanation of the various 
contractual methods DoD uses to remediate these hazardous waste sites. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND STATUTES 
Heightened Governmental and public awareness of environmental hazards has 
contributed to the strengthened position on environmental issues. [Ref. 7] To support 
this position, the Government has enacted numerous laws and regulations. As a major 
contributor to hazardous waste, the DoD and its contractors are significantly affected 
by environmental legislation. This section provides a summary of pertinent 
legislation to show the complexities and magnitude ofthese regulations and statues. 
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
In 1976, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was signed 
and subsequently amended in 1978, 1980, 1984, and 1986. The Act established a 
national strategy for hazardous waste management of current and future operations. 
The RCRA was designed to establish a Federal program to regulate hazardous waste 
management. The amendments resulted in a disposal prohibition of untreated 
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hazardous waste at landfills. The Act also provided minimum standards on all 
facilities handling hazardous material and a permit system for all treatment, storage 
and disposal facilities. [Ref. 17] 
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) was signed in 1980. In contrast to the RCRA, which covered current 
and future operations, the CERCLA authorized Federal action in response to 
environmental cleanup at abandoned or closed waste sites. This Act, also known as 
the "Superfund Act", authorized a trust fund to be used by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to cleanup emergency and long-term hazardous waste sites. 
The Act permits the Government to recover costs associated with the cleanup and 
damages to a site. The costs are than recovered from the responsible parties. 
Additional cleanup funds are drawn from a "superfund" created by taxes on chemicals 
and hazardous wastes. [Ref. 18:pp. 101-104] 
The Superfund Act was amended under the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986. The amendment extended CERCLA and 
established funds for four additional years which provided strict schedules for various 
phases of remedial activities. The amendment also established detailed cleanup 
standards. SARA restated that Federal facilities must comply with CERCLA and 
state environmental laws. [Ref. 18:pp. 104-108] 
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In 1985, the National Conting~ncy Plan (NCP) was written. The NCP 
provided the organizational structure and procedures for preparing and responding to 
discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. 
[Ref. 19:p. 15] The NCP is also the basic regulation that implements CERCLA, 
establishing documentation such as the National Priorities List (NPL) of hazardous 
materials and a Hazardous Ranking System (HRS) for past waste sites. [Ref. 20] 
3. Defense Environmental Restoration Program 
In 1984, to promote and coordinate efforts for the evaluation and cleanup of 
contamination at DoD installations, the Defense Environmental Restoration Program 
(DERP) was established. The DERP created a fund similar to the superfund but was 
designed explicitly for DoD sites. [Ref. 21 :p. 1] There are two programs under 
DERP: The Installation Restoration Program (IRP), which investigates potentially 
contaminated DoD installations and formerly used sites for cleanup; and Other 
Hazardous Waste (OHW) operations, which encourages research, development, and 
demonstration to improve remediation technologies and reduce DoD waste 
generation. [Ref. 21 :p. 1] 
DERP is managed centrally by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with 
policy direction and oversight by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Environment). Each DoD component is responsible for its own program 
implementation. [Ref. 21 :p. 1] 
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4. Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992 
In 1992, the Federal Facilities Compliance Act (FFCA) was signed. The Act 
clarifies that Federal facilities are subject to civil and administrative fines and 
penalties for violations of Federal, state, and local laws dealing with the handling of 
solid and hazardous wastes. The Act allows the EPA a new and powerful 
enforcement tool over the DoD; no longer could they rely on sovereign immunity. 
[Ref. 22] 
C. INITIAL STEPS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING 
All restoration programs are subject not only to Federal regulations but also 
state and local statues. Although all DoD components (Navy/Marine, Army, Air 
Force) have their own Installation Restoration Program (IRP) they are not a mirror 
image of each other. All basic concepts are the same but the terminology varies from 
Service to Service and even within Services. To better understand the process of 
environmental restoration, this section provides various stages of the remediation 
process. [Ref. 21 :p. 2] 
1. Pre-Remedial Activities 
The first stage is the Preliminary Assessment (PA) which determines ifthere 
are any sites present that may be hazardous to public health or the environment. As 
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part of the P A stage all available background information is gathered in order to 
identifY the extent of the potential hazard. [Ref. 23 :p. 4] 
The second stage is Site Inspection (SI), which consists of taking samples of 
media in question (e.g., soil, surface water, ground water) to determine the extent of 
contamination. The gathered data will be used to determine the proper corrective 
actions required. [Ref. 23:p. 5] 
A Hazard Ranking System (HRS) score is calculated based on data provided 
from the PA/SI. The score is based on factors such as: the amount and toxicity of 
contaminants present, their potential mobility in the environment, the availability of 
pathways for human exposure, and the proximity of population centers to the site. A 
score of 28.5 or greater places a site on the National Priorities List (NPL). The 
ranking ofthe NPL is updated on an annual basis. [Ref. 21:p. 2] 
2. Coordination With Public and Regulatory Agencies 
Coordination with regulatory agencies is a critical requirement in the 
restoration process. [Ref. 7] CERCLA requires that all regulatory agencies and the 
public be given the opportunity to review and comment on the results of any 
assessment or study. This is a critical point in the process because CERCLA now 
allows any citizen to sue any Federal agency which " .. .is alleged to be in violation of 
any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order" enacted under CERCLA. 
[Ref 23:p. 9] The Government can have these lawsuits dismissed ifit acts to comply 
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with the CERCLA requirement in question within 60 days of being notified of the 
suit. This portion of CERCLA highlights the political and watchdog environment 
under which DoD has been forced to operate. 
3. Evaluation of Remedial Alternatives 
In the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) stage, contaminated 
sites are fully studied. The RI may include further investigation of a site to determine 
more precisely the nature, extent, and significance of contamination. The evaluation 
also focuses on determining the risk to public health. The FS is conducted 
concurrently with the RI and evaluates the remedial alternatives for the site. The 
evaluation of remedial alternatives is based on the eight criteria established by the 
EPA, namely: [Ref. 20] · 
Overall protection of human health and the environment; 
Long-term effectiveness and permanence; 




State acceptance; and 
Community acceptance. 
The Record of Decision (ROD) is a legal document that must be prepared for 
the proposed cleanup plan of a site. It shows the rationale and decision making 
process to support the technical and legal decision made for a site. [Ref. 19:p. 19] 
.28 
If a site is NPL listed, the EPA must concur with the ROD. If the site in question is 
a non-NPL site, the remediation alternatives need only state approval. The ROD must 
be made available to the public. 
4. Implementation of Remedial Action 
The Remedial Design (RD) is prepared for a site once the remediation 
alternatives are agreed upon. The RD is based on RI/FS data and the ROD and is a 
detailed design for the cleanup of the site. [Ref. 19:p. 19] 
The Remedial Action (RA) will identify the work that is to be performed by 
specialized contractors, and may include activities such as removal/disposal of 
contaminated media and alternative water supply treatment. 
Once the remediation is complete, the site is closed out or deleted from the 
NPL. This is achieved if the site remediation is actually completed. DoD also 
considers a site "complete" if long-term remediation, such as a "pump and treat" 
system is in place and operational. A site can also be closed out during any phase if 
data deem that no further action is planned or required. [Ref. 19:p. 19] 
5. Installation Restoration Program Priorities 
This establishes the order in which DoD conducts IRP projects; the sites that 
represent tlie greatest potential public health and environmental hazards are assigned 
the highest priorities. DoD has developed the Defense Priority Model (DPM). The 
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model goes one step further than the HRS, by using RI data in addition to P A/SI data 
to assess the relative risk presented by a site. The model considers the following site 
characteristics: concentrations and mobility of the contaminants; the potential for 
contaminant transport via surface water, ground water, air/soil; and the presence of 
potential human and ecological receptors. [Ref. 21 :p. 3] 
This risk-based approach recognizes the importance of protecting public health 
and the environment, and objectively prioritizes sites for funding. In an austere 
funding environment, the DPM provides a method to determine which sites will be 
corrected first. This process takes a lengthy period of time because there is extensive 
regulatory involvement at each step. Every investigation, plan, study, and design is 
reviewed. A regulatory agency, Federal, state, or local, can reject any of these 
submissions if it does not satisfy their own requirements or regulations. Approval 
to move to the follow-on phase is not granted until all the regulatory agencies have 
approved the required documents. [Ref. 8] 
D. NAVY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NA VF AC) serves as the 
technical expert and provides centralized environmental funding through the 
Environmental Compliance Account and the Environmental Restoration Account. 
[Ref 24:p. 1] The CLEAN (Comprehensive Long-Term Environmental Action, 
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Navy) and RAC (Remedial Action Contract) contracts are a central part of 
NA VF AC 's strategy to deal with long-term, difficult to define environmental 
restoration and hazardous waste handling requirements. [Ref. 24:p. 1] The Cost-
Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) type of contract was selected for the CLEAN and RAC 
contracts in an attempt to increase the control of contract management and obtain the 
greatest performance value for a controlled amount of contractor profit. [Ref. 25] 
The CP AF contract is suitable for level-of-effort contracts for performance of services 
where mission feasibility is established but measurement of achievement must be by 
subjective evaluation rather than objective measurement. [Ref. 26] 
A basic characteristic of environmental studies and remedial action is the 
inability to accurately determine the scope of work before the actual study is made. 
FFP contracts provide inadequate control because ofthe frequent need to modify them 
to account for the additional services found to be necessary during execution of the 
contract. An original FFP contract takes on the characteristics of a cost contract if 
continually modified to cover an expanding scope. Even when such modifications are 
carefully negotiated, there lacks the cost-type contract's ability to continually monitor 
actual costs and incentives efficiency through use of an Award Fee. [Ref. 24:p. 2] 
1. Elements of the CP AF Contract 
This section is broken down into the different elements of a CP AF contract. 
The subsections explain how award and base fees are established and explain about 
the evaluation requirements. 
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a. Award/Base Fee 
The base fee is designed to compensate the contractor for profit 
evaluation factors such as risk, investment, and the nature of the work to be 
performed. [Ref. 14:p. 321] This fee is usually equal in amount to the minimum 
acceptable performance. The base fee is the minimum fee a contractor can earn and 
shall not exceed three percent. [Ref. 27:part 16.4] 
The award fee represents the additional amount available to reward the 
contractor for performance above the minimum acceptable levels in those areas 
identified by the evaluation criteria. [Ref. 28:p. 12] The total fee (base fee plus 
award fee) for this type of contract may not exceed ten percent of the estimated cost 
of the contract, excluding fee. [Ref. 27:part 15.903 (d)] 
The CLEAN and RAC contracts stay within these parameters but are 
always awarded without a base fee which is NA VF AC directed. [Ref. 16] Research 
indicates the reasoning behind the decision to negotiate a base fee of zero, is that the 
contractor is expected to perform the contract in a superior manner with a corres-
ponding high award fee. NA VF AC believes use of the entire potential fee as an 
award fee provides maximum incentive for excellent performance in the critical 
environmental context. [Ref. 28:p. 12] 
Of the interviews conducted with personnel at the seven conus 
Engineering Field Activities (EFAs)/Engineering Field Districts (EFAs), none had 
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experienced any problems with attracting offerors to bid on these zero base fee CP AF 
contracts. One interviewee indicated that it was not unusual to receive two dozen or 
more responsive and responsible potential offerors from a single request for proposal 
(RFP). [Ref. 29] Interviews with the contractors indicated that if they had their 
choice there would be a base fee but they accept the absence of one as the price of 
doing business with the Government. They did not indicate that the zero base fee had 
caused them to perform any better but admitted that it puts more emphasis on the 
award fee. [Refs. 30 and 31] 
NA VF AC has nothing in writing that indicates the CLEAN/RAC 
contracts award and base fees must be negotiated at the full six/ten percent 
respectively but all the interviewees indicated that their going in position on fees is 
always six/ten percent. The reasoning for allowing that high of a fee is that after the 
grading of the evaluation criteria, the fee rarely remains at that high of a level. [Ref. 
16] The average grade (fee) for RAC contracts over the seven EFAs/EFDs ranged 
from eight to eight and a half percent. With the strict non-inflated grading, the profits 
end up being lower than the going-in fee often percent. 
b. Evaluation Requirements 
As with all CP AF contracts, the contractor performance must be 
periodically assessed based on criteria expressed in the contract. NA VF AC provides 
guidance on how often the evaluations take place. Until recently, evaluation period 
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was four months for both the CLEAN and RAC contracts. The RAC and CLEAN 
contracts now have an evaluation period of four and six months respectively. Unable 
to determine for certain the reason for this change, a supervisor who was involved in 
one of the first CLEAN contracts over eight years ago, felt the change may have 
helped cut down on contract administration. He also commented that the time period 
required to complete the CLEAN contracts is longer but less dramatic than first 
anticipated. [Ref. 32] 
2. Evaluation Criteria and Rating System 
It is recommended that a detailed evaluation plan and approach for evaluating 
the contractor's actual performance against the evaluation criteria be used. [Ref. 3 3 :p. 
7 4] The plan should reflect the anticipated performance level and the conditions 
under which these levels are achieved. One must be cautious that the breakdown of 
the award pool over a large number of criteria can dilute emphasis. It also points out 
that emphasis can be shifted from one criterion to another by changing the weighting 
scheme if the Government wants more attention on one particular criterion. This must 
be done prior to the beginning of the evaluation period and the contractor must be 
notified. [Ref. 33:p. 91] 
NA VF AC stays well within these guidelines but requires the EFD/EF A to use 
the same four criteria and the same weight for these criteria in each contract. 
Although one supervisor felt the weights could be changed, no one does because of 
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the vast categories under each criteria and the added administrative burden. He also 
pointed out that with only four criteria a poor grade in any category will substantially 
reduce the contractor's fee. [Ref. 15] 
The four categories are technical compensation, cost and schedule control, 
program execution/quality management, and subcontractor and consultant manage-
ment. All of these criteria have an equal weighting of25%. At first appearance, these 
criteria seem somewhat nebulous, but each one has a list of subcategories which 
explains what makes up each criterion. Listed below are the different criteria and 
their subcategories. [Ref. 28:pp. 19-23] 
a. Technical Compensation 
Adhere to contract scope of work regulations and guidelines. 
Provide complete and accurate submittal including implementation/ 
sampling/health and safety plans, work plans, shop drawings, product 
data, samples and administrative closeout submittal. 
Respond to Government comments effectively and in a timely manner. 
Minimize rework through effective daily inspections. 
Demonstrate creativity and ingenuity in approach that results m 
technically innovative and/or cost effective solutions. 
b. Schedule and Cost Control 
Development and maintenance of planned budgets and schedules. 
Adjust schedules and prioritized requirements through innovation or 
other means. 
Timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of vouchers. 
Timeliness, accuracy arid completeness of deliverables. 
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c. Program Execution/Quality Management 
Responsiveness to program requirements and effective 
communications. 
Plan and manage workload surges/many ongoing delivery orders 
(DOs). 
Effective use of resources suitability of staffing. 
Manage an effective quality assurance (QA)/ quality control (QC) and 
Health & Safety Program. 
Adequacy, reporting, and maintenance of Government Property record 
administration. 
Adequate compliance with FAR Part 30-Cost Accounting Standards 
Administration. 
Completion of all tasks subject to the timely submittal of costs and 
D.O. interim closeout information. 
Effectiveness of Contractor's purchasing system (DF ARS Appendix 
"C" Contractor Purchasing System Reviews). 
d. Subcontractor and Consultant Management 
Selection of appropriate subcontractors and/or consultants. 
Effective control of costs and resources. 
Timely and adequate schedule submission and management of actual 
performance. 
Effective communication resulting in efficient coordination. 
Adherence to subcontracting plan. 
Compliance with all applicable contract clauses and provisions 
The grading system is broken down into four levels, each level is 
decided by the grade or percent awarded. The percentage/grade is multiplied by 25% 
and by adding the four criteria together one can determine what percent of the fee the 
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contractor will receive for that evaluati.on period. For example if the four criteria 
markings are 100%, 90%, 80% and 70% respectfully, by multiplying each mark by 
the 25% assigned to each criterion, and than by adding the four results together, it is 
than determined that the contractor will receive 85% of the assigned fee in that 
particular evaluation period (assuming everything scheduled in that rating period was 
completed). [Ref. 16] Below are the guidelines used for determining the grade 
assigned. [Ref. 28:pp. 24-25] 
LEVEL I (90°/o-lOOo/o of available award fee) 
Technical performance which corrects the hazardous waste problem 
which may have innovative elements. 
Timely completion with minor corrections, or completion after 
increases due to additional requirements or regulatory changes. 
Highly effective management of the subcontracted effort. 
Control of cost yields some savings. 
Results recognized from continuous improvement. May include minor 
correctable weaknesses in products and services. 
LEVEL II (60°/o-89o/o of available award fee) 
Reasonable technical quality and effective management. 
Timely deliverables and schedule control with some corrections and 
slippage. 
Successful management of subcontracted effort. 
How effective cost controls are. 
Strives to make continuous improvements. This may include some 
correctable weaknesses in products and services. 
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LEVEL III (30%-59°/o of available award fee) 
Quality only acceptable with Government input. 
Changes in delivery schedule which do not cause significant problems. 
Adequate management of subcontracted effort with some inefficiencies. 
Reasonable cost control with some increase in cost. 
No continuous improvement efforts visible. Some deficiencies in 
products and services which require Government input to correct. 
LEVEL IV (0%-29% of available award fee) 
Technical performance does not follow the design of the Record of 
Decision, and does not correct the hazardous waste problem. 
Failure to meet delivery schedule without notice of plan for correction. 
Failure to monitor subcontractors and/or consultants. 
Significant cost increases due to inadequate performance. 
Deficiencies so pervasive as to require substantial rework. 
Ineffective relations with Navy, other Federal, and/or state regulators. 
E. ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING 
1. General Features 
The Army's TERC is a cradle-to-grave, Indefmite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
type of contract. A TERC is designed for the total remediation of sites/projects but 
it must first be determined whether the project is within the TERC parameters. In 
order for a TERC to be awarded, it must have an "anchor" installation designated 
where a portion of the remedial work is to be accomplished. The "anchor" 
installation maintains central control of the overall TERC. The TERC is not limited 
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to use at only the anchor site(s). Remediation projects that are deemed eligible to be 
performed under the TERC can be located anywhere within the awarding district's 
region of responsibility. For example, a Sacramento TERC may include remediation 
efforts at both Stead Air Force Base and Hunter Army Airfield, and both locations 
might not be listed as the anchor installation. [Ref. 34:p. 25] 
The maximum anticipated allowable value of any TERC is $200 million. The 
longest period of performance allowed is ten years. The total length often years is 
based upon a base period of four years and two subsequent three-year options, if 
exercised. TERC contracts that exceed 125 percent of the maximum anticipated value 
require Department of the Army approval prior to award. However, the minimum 
amount guaranteed is only $200 thousand per period of contract issuance. The 
contract is performed in accordance with delivery orders which are negotiated and 
issued on a cost-reimbursement basis for each remediation project and its related 
tasks. The preferred methods of cost-reimbursement are via Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee 
(CPFF) or Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contracts. Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) 
contracts are also used but only on a case-by-case basis. [Ref. 35] 
Funding for DoD remediation projects under the TERC comes from either the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA) or the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) account. The DERA account covers both active installations and 
inactive defense sites, while the BRAC account solely covers remediation work at 
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BRAC installations. If any other agency (non-DoD) requires remediation under the 
TERC, it is performed by using either that agency's operations and maintenance funds 
or the Superfund. 
2. Acquisition Planning 
The TERC arrangement is not appropriate for all remediation projects. The 
ultimate use of a TERC is reviewed at each step of the decision process, it is tightly 
controlled both at the Corps' District level and then again at the Corps' Headquarters 
level. 
The proposed project must go through an extensive screening process, prior to 
selecting the TERC method of contracting. As the proposed project flows through the 
process, it is screened by Corps representatives who determine if the project's 
requirements meet the criteria for TERC contract usage. If the remediation site is 
considered a valid candidate, it is then reviewed at the next higher echelon to 
determine if the responsible district office of the Corps has the available resources 
(e.g., trained staffing, funding, customer commitment) to execute a TERC contract. 
[Ref. 34:p. 26] 
Ultimately, the Principal Assistant for Contracting (P ARC) for the Corps 
retains contracting oversight responsibility for all TERC contracts and must approve 
all TERC acquisition plans, Commerce Business Daily (CBD) announcements, and 
RFPs prior to release. This level of oversight ensures that there will be no deviations 
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from the Corps' TERC acquisition plan, or that deviations are warranted and do not 
alter the integrity of the TERC contracting method. 
At least one of the following elements, as dictated in the Corps Management 
Plan for TERC contracts, must exist at a remediation site and be included in the 
district's need statement, prior to the decision to use a TERC: 
a. The project must exist at a remediation site and be included in the 
anchor installation's needs statement prior to the decision and approval 
to use a TERC. 
b. Project funding is phased by site (operable unit). 
c. Coordination of more than one contractor on an installation presents 
unacceptable administration problems in such areas as coordination and 
movement ofworkforces and equipment, separation and acceptance of 
contractor responsibility, and verification of performance and progress. 
d. The project must be comprised of two or more sites. 
e. Project conditions must indicate a high probability that interim 
remediation of point sources of contamination will be required. 
f. Pre-remediation and remediation activity require significant interface 
and coordination. 
g. Close coordination of cleanup efforts must be maintained between sites. 
h. Pre-remediation activity between sites require critical interface. 
1. The proposed project(s) for which a TERC contract will be considered 
must include both design and remedial action efforts. Once an installa-
tion is approved for remediation under a TERC contract, no remedia-
tion work, except that which is under existing contracts, should be 
performed outside the TERC contract. 
j. Project conditions indicate there will be a need for the contractor to 
respond quickly to situations without interference from another 
contractor working in close proximity to the site. [Ref. 4:pp. 8-9] 
41 
Coupled with the tight control ofTERC contract usage is the required training 
that must take place. Key administrative representatives of the Corps must undergo 
mandatory training on TERC background and its implementation prior to their 
involvement in the selection, award, and administration processes. Upon completion 
of this training, the TERC management plan calls for the assignment of a project 
manager for the life of the contract and for key members of the TERC team to retain 
their TERC responsibilities for extended periods. It is the Army's desire to maintain 
a consistent approach in the management of the TERC contracts. [Ref. 4:p. 11] 
3. The TERC Request For Proposals (RFP) 
The Army provides a standard TERC RFP format to ensure a consistent 
approach by each district as contracts are solicited for environmental remediation 
cleanup efforts. All of the districts with TERC contracting authority must adhere to 
this Corps' standard TERC RFP format. Any deviations from the standard RFP, must 
be pre-approved by the PARC. [Ref. 36] 
Each RFP must provide every type of work effort that is anticipated to be 
required for successful contract performance. Work efforts can include site investiga-
tions, predesign and design efforts and remedial construction associated with a 
remedial solution. The solicitation must also address: the boundaries of the contract 
(generally the district's area of responsibility), the location of known project sites, and 
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the potential that the contractor may be required to perform remedial efforts at sites 
other than those listed in the solicitation. [Ref. 36] 
A unique feature of the TERC solicitation is the requirement for the written 
performance of a sample project by any contractor who submits a bid. The project 
represents situations that may well be encountered while performing the actual· 
contract, at the same time being unique to each new solicitation. For example, in the 
RFP for a Fort Ord TERC, a requirement was included to develop a plan to perform 
all remedial work, covering all remediation phases: site investigation through 
operations and maintenance at an Army NPL site in California. The sample site had 
requirements for both soil and water remediation. [Ref. 34:p. 31] 
4. Source Selection 
For the TERC contracting method, the goal of the source selection process is 
to select, via a competitive negotiation, the contractor's proposal who represents the 
best value to the Government. Best value is determined by the evaluation of each 
offeror's proposal on the basis of its technical approach and cost realism, 
reasonableness, affordability, and the previously mentioned hypothetical project. The 
hypothetical project itself is evaluated on all of the same criteria. The TERC RFP 
evaluation criteria are broken into six sections or volumes, which cover the following 
subject areas: Volume I, Business, Management and Technical Approach; Volume 
II, Experience, Organization and Personnel; Volume III, Operational Management 
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Plan; Volume IV; Acquisition Management Plan; Volume V, Cost; Volume VI, 
Sample Project. [Ref 4:pp. 13-17] All volumes of the source selection criteria, other 
than cost, are point scored. Cost is evaluated as to its reasonableness and is used to 
assist the Army in determining the level of understanding that a given contractor has 
of projected work requirements. [Ref. 35] 
5. Contract Type 
With the use of a TERC contract, each delivery order must be negotiated 
individually. As dictated in the TERC Management Plan, the approved contractual 
agreements for delivery orders are either CP AF or CPFF. Fixed-price and time and 
materials contracts are not authorized for use in a TERC contract. However, the 
prime contractor is able to use any type of contract with its subcontractors. In many 
cases, subcontractors will perform under fixed-price arrangements, which are 
facilitated by the definition of their performance tasks. [Ref. 35] 
The Army usually uses a CPFF arrangement, based on the degree of 
uncertainties associated with the tasks to be performed within the delivery orders. 
The uncertainties make it difficult to establish target incentives that the contractor can 
achieve and the incentive arrangement may not adequately reflect the quality of the 
contractor's performance. For this reason, the use of CPIF contracts require special 
approval and Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) arrangements are not allowed. [Ref. 
36] 
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The CPFF arrangement pays the contractor's fee that is fixed and negotiated 
at the conception ofthe delivery order, in addition to allowable costs incurred (costs 
that are reasonable, allocable, and those negotiated for the delivery order). The 
contractor's fee does not change with the cost of the work that is delivered/ 
performed, rather, it remains constant throughout performance. The fee amount may 
only change if the scope of work required under the delivery order changes. Under 
the CPFF arrangement, the fee cannot exceed ten percent of the agreed upon cost 
estimate that resulted from negotiations. There are no limitations on how low the fee 
percentages can go. [Ref. 27:part 15] 
As previously mentioned, the most prominent feature to a cost-reimbursement 
contract is that it is based on a level-of-effort. Therefore, if the contractor does not 
perform the tasks required in the delivery order within the cost estimate, the 
contractor is still entitled to all of his fee. If this is the situation, the Government has 
two options, make more funds available to continue performance without an increase 
in fee or stop work. The Army has two modes of executing CPFF delivery orders. 
The first is the completion form which requires a scope of work that defines a specific 
goal or target and provides an end product and the second and less desirable is the 
term form which only requires a "level-of-effort". [Ref. 34:pp. 39-40] 
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6. Contract Administration 
Upon the award of a TERC contract, the prime contractor is required to prepare 
a detailed management plan. The plan is developed with the guidance of the TERC's 
administering district. The management plan must includes a work plan that reflects 
costs and schedules; health, safety, and environmental protection; staffing numbers 
and qualifications; information systems and reports; and a plan for exercising quality 
control. The Army is responsible for assisting the contractor in the development of 
the management plan. It should incorporate the district's current administrative 
standard operating procedures (SOP) in the plan in order to minimize the development 
of new and special procedures for a specific TERC contract. [Ref. 4:pp. 20-21] 
7. Work Plan Development 
The contractor must prepare a work plan that responds in detail to the Army's 
directed statement ofwork. [Ref.4:p. 21] These statements of work must be done for 
each delivery order exercised by the Army under the TERC contracting method. The 
work plan must address a proposed schedule that differentiates the time requirements 
for each task within the statement of work, interrelationships between tasks, and a 
critical path. The work plan also includes site control measures that require permits 
and licenses; deliverables that will be performed within the delivery order, a site 
description and contaminate characterization; and key personnel, who will be used on 
the project and their responsibilities. [Ref. 4:p. 21] 
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The work plan must be approved by the administering district prior to the 
contractor's execution of it. The standard time line from the contractor's receipt of 
the delivery order through the approval of a final work plan is five weeks. The five 
week time period includes: preparation, review and modification, and finally, 
approval. [Ref. 4:p. 22] 
Each delivery order work plan is broken down into individual actions. Each 
action reflects the specific detailed plans that cover how a given remediation project 
will be performed. The plan must also address how compliance with applicable 
regulatory requirements will be met. [Ref. 36] 
8. On-Site Management 
Responsibility for the administration of a TERC contract is placed on the 
Corps of Engineers resident engineer. He/she is responsible for the coordination, 
reporting and management of all remedial actions on-site. The resident engineer is 
responsible for keeping both the TERC Project Manager (PM) and the site technical 
manager informed concerning the current status of the projects. The resident engineer 
and the quality inspectors have the added responsibility of monitoring a contractor's 




One of the most important aspects of the TERC contract is its partnering 
requirement. The use of the TERC contracting method requires a partnering 
arrangement between the prime contractor, customer representative and the Army 
Corps of Engineers representatives. The partnering is enhanced and stabilized by the 
TERC contracting method and its requirements. One such requirement is a manage-
ment plan for the contractor which is jointly developed. Without partnering, two of 
the TERC's most critical aspects, project concurrency and project flexibility, cannot 
be achieved. Partnering assists in the clear definition and interpretation of require-
ments, and subsequently, the development of methods of monitoring and evaluating 
the completion of requirements. [Ref. 35] 
F. AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING 
The Air Force environmental remediation has numerous similarities to the 
Navy and Army. Because of these similarities this will be the only mention of the Air 
Force. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with the Air Force 
environmental contracting that will be incorporated into the both the Navy and Army 
segments of this thesis. 
As with the other Services, the Air Force uses the specific nature of the 
environmental remediation as a determining factor in choosing what contract type to 
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execute. The more complex or speculative the remediation, the greater the risk and 
the more difficulty in using a fixed-price type contract. 
In similarity with the Navy and Army, the Air Force uses the scope of work 
and intensity of the competition to influence what type of contract to use. As with the 
other Services, lack of competition is a rarity and the scope of the work is the main 
factor in deciding what contract type to use. Some other factors the Air Force uses 
when considering what contract type to use is time available, experience with 
environmental remediation, the apparent soundness of the order price, and the 
technical and development state of the remediation method proposed to be used. In 
less common instances, the length of the performance time and economic information 
can play a large part in determining the best contract type. 
The Air Force environmental infrastructure is built around the Air Force 
Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE). [Ref. 37] The dissimilarity between 
the Air Force and the other branches begins here. Decisions on the corrective action 
necessary is determined at the local level. The decision depends on the local working 
rapport with the state and local environmental regulators, the local Air Force 
environmental branches talent and the environmental branches present workload. If 
the local Air Force environmental branch has a strained working rapport with the 
local EPA, for example, the environmental remediation project is more apt to be 
deferred to the AFCEE. If this environmental branch enjoys a good working 
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relationship with the local EPA, the branch is more apt to put a project on their 
backlog vice deferring it to AFCEE. 
The AFCEE is a centralized command broken down into regions, each with 
its own policies on how to administer environmental contracts. All AFCEEs interpret 
the Brooks Architect-Engineering (AlE) Act in the same light as the Navy. It should 
be noted that a substantial portion of the Air Force's environmental budget goes to 
TERC contracts (18% in FY 95) that are administered by the Army. Even though the 
Air Force does not administer their own TERC contracts, by transferring funds to the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the Army executes almost a fifth of the Air Force's 
environmental restoration budget. The decision to have the Army administer a TERC 
contract is at the discretion of the individual AFCEE. [Ref. 38] 
The environmental remediation contract administered by the AFCEE are 
similar to the TERC in that the contracts are three to four years in length with two 
subsequent two or three year options. But as mentioned previously, all AlE 
contractors are not allowed to bid on the actual environmental remediation contracts 
for which they did the AlE portion of the project. [Ref. 39] 
G. SUMMARY 
Chapter III highlighted how the different DoD Services correct their individual 
hazardous sites. Both the Navy and the Army employ very different contracting 
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strategies to handle their respective hazardous site cleanups and each is convinced 
their method is the proper approach. [Ref. 40] Chapter IV provides the advantages 




IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter focuses on the Navy-specific environmental restoration contracts 
(CLEAN/RAC) and Army-specific TERC contracts. All Services of the DoD use a 
wide array of contract types, from FFP to CPFF, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quality (ID/IQ) and everything in between on the spectrum of contract types 
available. All contract types have their own advantages, disadvantages and situations 
for their use. Some branches of the Service tend to use more of one particular 
contract type than others but the purpose of this chapter is not to identify that a 
particular Service is making greater use of a certain contract type but to weigh the 
pros and cons of the CLEAN/RAC contracts and the TERC contracts. 
B. NAVY'S ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION CONTRACTS 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NA VF AC) and its components 
have done well in the area of environmental restoration contracting. [Ref. 40] The 
Navy selected an appropriate contract organization, type and award method for 
environmental contracting. [Ref. lO:p. 57] The Navy has used lessons learned in a 
positive manner to help shape the present Navy CLEAN/RAC contracts. [Ref. lO:p. 
49] One of the lessons learned was to limit the contract scope to geographical regions 
so the particular EFD/EF A has full control over the project. Another lesson was to 
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write the contracts so the contractors/subcontractors are capable of remediating all 
contaminants (except ordnance and nuclear waste). This is to increase the flexibility 
of the contract if unknown contaminants are identified. [Ref. 16] 
1. Advantages 
Determining if a particular aspect of a contract is an advantage or a 
disadvantage is often not clear cut. There will be incidents where a particular feature 
may be both an advantage and a disadvantage. One must keep in mind that just 
because an item is identified as a disadvantage, procedures, if properly applied, can 
neutralize this negative factor. Even though an item may be identified as a 
disadvantage in this chapter, there may be Commands that make it nonexistent 
because a counterbalancing mechanism is being be properly applied. 
a. Award Fee 
Some contracting personnel feel that while the CP AF contract provides 
a greater motivation to the contractor, these contracts bring with them increased 
administrative requirements and costs. Others state that the CP AF contract can work 
well if there is an experienced team for the Navy, who are able to negotiate well and 
provide strong oversight and monitoring. [Ref. IO:pp. 51-52] 
The choice to use the CP AF contract shows the Navy considered the 
complexity of the work in environmental contracting, and determined it to be more 
than a "commodity". The Navy recognized that the contracts would be highly 
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complex in nature, and would require contractors with highly specialized and 
technical skills. The contractors would also need to be experienced and well-versed 
in environmental policies and regulations. As a result, the Navy choose a contract 
type that can provide greater emphasis on technical merit, rather than awarding a 
contract based on the lowest bid price. [Ref. 16] 
NA VF AC determined the CP AF contract was more advantageous 
because it can provide greater motivation to the contractor by better controlling their 
remediation efforts. However, the EFD/EF A must provide adequate staffing and 
training to administer this type contract. Otherwise, the Navy may find this a 
disadvantage if they put themselves in a situation of awarding the entire fee to the 
contractor, instead of being burdened with the complex requirements of evaluating an 
award fee commensurate with contractor's performance. [Ref. 16] 
b. Brooks Architect-Engineer Act 
The Navy's interpretation of the Brooks AlE Act is that the environ-
mental remediation contracts are of the construction type. The Act requires all 
construction contracts to have at least two contractors, one for the AlE (CLEAN) 
portion and one for the actual construction (RAC). In short, with the Navy's 
interpretation of the Brooks AlE Act, the RAC and CLEAN contractors for a 
particular project cannot be the same. In reality, this puts the RAC contractor in a 
position to reevaluate or double check what the CLEAN contractor had identified in 
55 
their AlE portion of the contract. The RAC contractor has a vested interest in getting 
as accurate a CLEAN contract as possible. [Ref. 41 :pp. 8-9] 
The Navy's more conservative interpretation of the Brooks AlE Act 
allows that at a later date there may be some clarification or the development of a 
single DoD interpretation of the Act. This clarification may allow the Navy to 
develop their own "cradle-to-grave" approach similar to the Army's. [Ref. 40] 
c. Flexibility 
Another advantage of the Navy's environmental contracting method is 
their decision to use the CP AF contract type which has flexibility built into it. The 
contractor's fee is based on the Navy's subjective evaluation of how well the 
contractor applies its efforts in meeting the Navy's needs. The contract provides a 
flexibility to the Navy to correct the unknowns that are inherent in the environmental 
remediation world. 
The award fee also introduces an element of flexibility since the Navy 
can change the weighting that each evaluation element receives. These changes must 
be brought to the contractor's attention by providing advance guidance before the 
beginning of the evaluation period. The award fee gives the Navy a flexible tool with 
which to influence a contractor's performance. [Ref. 9:p. 286] 
d. Risk Aversion 
Contrasted with a fixed-price contract type, a conventional CP AF 
contract shifts the risk sharing towards the buyer because, primarily the contractor is 
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guaranteed all of his costs and the base fee. With the CLEAN/RAC contract there is 
no base fee thus all of the potential fee is included in the award fee pool. This puts 
the contractor in a position to possibly incur cost and not receive any fee if it is 
determined their performance is evaluated as unsatisfactory (level IV). [Ref. 16] 
2. Disadvantages 
The Navy and its contractors are continually learning from and improving the 
processes of their CLEAN/RAC contracts. 
a. Timely 
If time constraints are important to the site remediation, the CLEAN/ 
RAC arrangement may not be suitable. Several factors lead to time constraints being 
an important driver. Many sites have been contaminated for several years and the 
longer the contaminant is left in place, the higher the risk of it spreading. Timely site 
cleanup could play a key factor for an effective environmental remediation project. 
The CLEAN/RAC contract arrangement is not designed to allow RAC contracts to 
start before the CLEAN contractor has finished the AlE portion of the project. This 
leads to a lengthened contract period because of the inability of the two different 
contractors to work concurrently. [Ref. 16] 
b. Administrative Costs 
A significant administrative responsibility is assumed by the Govern-
ment when using the award-fee contract. The requirements for additional monitoring 
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and auditing adds substantially to the cost of administering a contract. [Ref. 14:p. 
321] The CLEAN/RAC contract arrangement doubles this disadvantage because the 
Navy must go through the administrative responsibility for the AlE portion and then 
again for the actual cleanup contract. 
c Redundancy 
The Navy's interpretation ofthe Brooks AlE Act causes a certain degree 
of redundancy in the way it accomplishes environmental contracting. Because the 
CLEAN and RAC contractors cannot be the same there is a certain amount of 
redundancy of effort on the part of the RAC contractors. The RAC contractors often 
reconfirm the results of the CLEAN contractors. This is to ensure the AlE portion 
was done accurately because the RAC contractor does not want to rely on 
misinformation received from the CLEAN contractor. This reconfirming of results 
ends up raising the cost of the contract with little or no added value. [Ref. 16] 
C. ARMY'S ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION CONTRACTS 
The strength of the TERC contract and its application rests in that the Army 
is aware that this contracting technique is not a method to encompass all 
environmental remediation efforts. The TERC contract is a well-conceived and 
applied contracting method. The Army has carefully determined the uses for which 
this contracting method is applicable. The Army does not rule out other contracting 
methods as appropriate for use in particular situations. [Ref. 35] 
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The Army has strict guidelines for the application of the TERC contract which 
prevents any misapplication of its intended use. These guidelines include both the 
screening criteria which may lead to a site's nomination for remediation under a 
TERC contract and the approval process. As pointed out in Chapter III, the Army is 
constantly ensuring that TERC contracts are administered in situations intended for 
their use. 
As with the Navy's CLEANIRAC contracts, the TERC contract has evolved 
as the results of lessons learned. The TERC has developed principally as a result of 
contracting inefficiencies that caused both cost and schedule growth. The Corps' use 
of fixed-price contracts for remedial efforts, despite the effort's complexity, lead in 
many cases to the effort experiencing either cost growth, schedule growth or both. 
Cost and schedule growth have also been associated with the use of multiple 
contractors to accomplish restoration efforts in accordance with an inflexible 
sequence of remedial steps. This leads to the situation where a contractor is not able 
to start until the previous contractor is complete, similar to what the Navy is 
experiencing with their CLEANIRAC contracts. [Ref. 35] 
1. Advantages 
Discussed below are the advantages ofTERC contracts. As with the CLEAN/ 
RAC contracts, determining if a particular aspect of a contract is an advantage or a 
disadvantage is often subjective. 
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a. Sample Project 
The sample project is one of the items that is required by each new 
TERC RFP and includes remediation tasks that are representative of the situations that 
will be encountered by the awardee once selected. The sample project is a unique 
vehicle within each offeror's proposal that allows the Corps to assess a given offeror's 
understanding of the contractual, technical, administrative and cost requirements 
associated with a given situation. [Ref. 36] 
The sample project enables the Army to subjectively evaluate each 
offeror's approach to a remediation situation and plays a decisive role in contract 
award. The source selection board compares an offeror's sample project solution to 
the way it proposes to do business in the rest of its proposal. The board uses these 
comparisons to determine ifthere is consistency between the two. Accordingly, the 
Army is able to evaluate the offeror's approach to the stated requirements. The Army 
can then evaluate the technical approach to determine if it meets the requirement and 
whether or not it is an innovative or proven method of meeting the needs of the 
project. The sample project also provides the Army an insight into the cost estimates 
and realism of the offeror's approach and enables the firm to use any new technology 
that they may have developed. [Ref. 36] 
No "textbook solution" is available that could be reused or improved 
upon for each subsequent TERC RFP because .the sample project is tailored to each 
60 
new TERC solicitation. This allows the Army an opportunity to lessen its risk of 
selecting a contractor that does not understand the depth of effort and intricacies 
associated with environmental contracting. [Ref. 36] 
b. Innovative 
The design portion of the TERC contract does not give details on how 
to accomplish the remediation but only provides the potential contractor with a scope 
of work to be performed and its proposed method of remediation. This lack of 
specificity, particularly in the method of performance, allows the offeror to develop 
a remediation work plan that may well be more innovative and/or efficient than a 
statement of work that might have been prescribed by the Army's design engineers. 
The Corps reviews the offeror's proposed work plan along with Federal and state 
regulators (if they choose to be involved in the work plan process). The review 
process ensures that the proposed methods meet the stated regulatory requirements 
and that the work plan is efficient and supports the Government's best interests. This 
requires the offeror to ensure that the plan provides the best solution within the 
Government's means and also meets regulatory requirements. [Ref. 35] 
The involvement of the Federal and state regulatory agencies as early 
as possible through the design approval stage allows all parties to address problems 
before the actual remediation commences. The up-front planning and involvement 
reduces cost and schedule growth. If deficiencies are identified later in the process, 
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their corrections are usually more expensive and time consuming. This innovative 
method of early involvement ensures that requirements are met on the front-end of 
project planning, rather than after the project has commenced. [Ref. 35] 
c. Timely 
The TERC contracting method allows the Government to save a signifi-
cant amount of money and time relating to the solicitation process alone. If the 
contracts were executed with the use of conventional construction contracting 
methods, where individual segments were contracted separately, the Government runs 
the chance of incurring both a significant growth in costs and in the schedule required 
to perform the project. For example, if there were four distinct remediation projects 
separated individually and contracted for under traditional contracting methods, the 
Government would incur the cost of no less than eight separate solicitations. This is 
because each project would be broken down to at least a design contract and a 
construction contract. The Army would also incur a comparable growth in the 
procurement process and contract execution schedule that would be solely attributable 
to the time and administrative effort required to solicit, award and administer eight 
separate contracts. [Ref. 35] 
d. Flexibility 
Even though the Army provides a boilerplate acquisition plan and RFP, 
procedures are in place to allow the two to be flexible and conform to each particular 
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situation. Consistent with the tight controls placed on the TERC contracting method, 
is the use of a standard acquisition plan and RFP for its solicitations. The TERC is 
governed by a boilerplate Army acquisition plan and each District's individual 
acquisition plan must conform to the Army's plan. The plan may be modified only 
to meet the particular idiosyncrasies of that District and requires approval from higher 
authority. The standard RFP is only modified between each new TERC solicitation. 
This incorporates the tailoring required to meet the new stated requirements for the 
given remediation sites or to incorporate lessons-learned from previously issued 
solicitations. [Ref. 36] 
e. Concurrency 
The single contractor approach eliminates the additional time that would 
be required for a second contractor to learn the same lessons (those already learned 
by the preceding contractor) all over again, as well as the additional costs associated 
with that learning process. A single prime contractor for all phases of the remediation 
effort promotes knowledge retention throughout the project's lifecycle and reduces 
the potential for either schedule and! or cost growth, associated with changing a 
contractor between the design and cleanup phases. Additionally, the Government 
avoids the cost and schedule growth that may occur as the second contractor comes 
on board and defines the site conditions differently or more thoroughly than its 
predecessor. [Ref. 34:pp. 50-51] 
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The Army conducted a study that exhibited the schedule savings that 
can be achieved through the use of the TERC contracting method. The study was 
based on the work allocation document at an Army post for its water pumping and 
treatment plant. The study found that under traditional construction contracting 
methods, the performance ofwork from time of award would have taken 21 months. 
Under the TERC contracting method, the same project was determined to require only 
15 months providing a six-month schedule savings on only one project of many. 
[Ref. 34:p. 51] 
f. Administration 
By using a single contractor for all phases of the remediation process, 
the TERC contract promotes contract administration cost and schedule savings via a 
single point of contact for all work. The ability of the contractor to perform work on 
different project segments concurrently, the inherent knowledge of projects, the 
requirement for only one solicitation and other contract administration related items, 
saves both time and money. [Ref. 3 5] 
The Army's oversight ability is not diluted through the administration 
of multiple contracts and contractors. The single point of contact allows the Corps' 
residency offices and their respective managing districts to focus on a single 
contractual document and a single contractor. [Ref. 35] 
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g. Efficiency 
The TERC contract's single delivery order allows both the Government 
and the contractor to work more efficiently within the budget of one contractual 
agreement that has several segments versus a budget for each contract. Thus, cost 
overruns on one project can be counterbalanced by a savings from another project or 
work allocation document and the project does not have to be rebaselined. The single 
delivery order still requires contract cost and budget management, but to a lesser 
degree than a delivery order for each remediation project. A single delivery order 
also promotes speed in contract closeout. A single delivery order for multiple projects 
facilitates a contract closeout which is easier and quicker than a multiple delivery 
order would. [Ref. 35] 
With the single delivery order, all work must be accomplished prior to 
its closure. In other words, a project could have to remain open because a small 
segment has not been completed, therefore holding up final closeout and payment. 
This is added motivation for the contractor to complete the whole project. The single 
contractor remains focused on all work because they are aware that the contract 
cannot be closed out until all work is completed. [Ref. 35] 
h. Training 
An additional advantage ofthe TERC contract is the requirement for the 
district administering the proposed contract to have key personnel trained in TERC 
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applications and procedures. The majority of the training is designed to support those 
individuals at the TERC's second-tier, the program management level. The Army 
does provide some training to its first-tier, resident offices. 
In the past the Corps' contracts, whether for remediation efforts or for 
normal design and construction efforts, have been performed under fixed-price type 
contracts. Because of this, field representatives in the residency offices may not have 
sufficient experience to administer cost-reimbursement contracts. The shift from a 
fixed-price type of contract to a cost-reimbursement contract, such as the TERC, 
make the required training for the Army representatives essential. [Ref. 35] 
2. Disadvantages 
The Army and its contractors are continually learning and improving the 
processes of their TERC contracts. As previously noted, some adjustments have 
taken place and the following disadvantages are not necessarily Army-wide. As the 
case with partnering and administration these disadvantages may not always exist if 
proper corrective measures are put in place. 
a. Partnering 
For a TERC contract to be successful, partnering must be taken 
seriously and viewed as a crucial element of the contract. The team should consist of 
the contractor, the Corps representative, the customer who represents the installation's 
interests and Federal and state regulators. [Ref. 35] 
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Ownership of the partnering program is critical to the TERC's success. 
The District's approach must facilitate ownership by naming specific key individuals 
who represent each of the partners as champions of the program. Therefore, the 
partnering program receives focused support and is not just a responsibility that is 
haphazardly delegated to each site. A partnership, in order to be effective, requires 
trust and openness, productive communications, informed decision making and a 
problem resolution process between team members. If any of these elements are not 
in place, the partnering effort will be reduced. One potential resulting problem is that 
there may be a less than arm's-length relationship between the customer and the 
contractor, or the Corps and the contractor. [Ref. 35] 
b. Administration 
The Army's District offices must guard against a conflict of interest 
stemming from the contractor's oversight of the complete project. Principally, the 
Army must guard against a design effort that is beyond that which is required causing 
an increased total cost to the Government. The Army employs two principal methods 
to control the potential for a conflict of interest. First, they employ their own design 
engineers who review the contractor's designs to ensure that they comply and do not 
exceed the scope of the design guidance provided by the Army. Second, under the 
TERC contracting method, the Army employs a cost-reimbursable contract for each 
work order. Thus the fee, whether fixed, award, or incentive, is associated with an 
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initial cost estimate proposed by the contractor and not their total costs ultimately 
incurred. Therefore, the contractor has no incentive to over-design and increase the 
amount of work required because it will not result in an increased fee. [Ref. 35] 
c. Training 
As pointed out previously, a critical point relating to the approval 
process is the requirement for the District administering the proposed TERC contract 
to have key personnel associated with the project management trained in TERC 
contract application. The Army must take this requirement seriously and has 
contracted with the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to conduct all TERC 
contract training. The training ensures that the Army is administering TERC 
contracts in a consistent manner to prevent the misuse of this contracting method. 
[Ref. 4:p. 11] 
The Army must ensure the TERC management plan calls for the 
assignment of the project manager for the life of the contract and for key members to 
retain their responsibilities for extended periods. If any of the training and 
consistency measures are not in place it can be detrimental to the successful execution 
ofthe TERC contract. [Ref. 4:p. 11] 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the advantages and disadvantages of the CLEAN/RAC 
and TERC contracting methods. With-the use of these advantages and disadvantages 
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in addition to the information provided previously, the next chapter analyzes the 





The previous chapters were devoted to identifying the unique problems 
associated with environmental contracting and documenting the positions taken by 
DoD in response to environmental cleanup costs facing them. Also provided were the 
advantages and disadvantages facing each Service as a result of their chosen method 
of contracting for environmental remediation. This chapter analyzes the facts, as well 
as the opinions and interpretation of the material presented in previous chapters. 
B. COMPARISON OF NAVY AND ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTRACTING 
This section provides an analytical comparison of the Navy's CLEAN/RAC 
contracts and the Army's TERC contracts. The purpose of this section is to bring out 
some of the philosophical similarities and differences between the two contracting 
methods. 
1. Contract Type 
It is often difficult to determine what contract type to use for environmental 
restoration. All of Chapter II was dedicated to providing the reader with an idea about 
some of the difficulties encountered in the ever changing field of environmental 
contracting. From changing technology and regulations, to the inability to accurately 
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define the scope of work, environmental restoration requires a contract type that can 
quickly adapt to these circumstances. 
As in any procurement, the determination of the best contract type for a given 
situation requires a careful analysis of all relevant factors. Even after careful 
consideration of all factors there will still be situations where the contract type is not 
readily apparent. The selection of a contract type is not an exact science, 
consequently this thesis will not attempt to determine a particular "silver bullet" 
contract type that should be used for all environmental contracting. 
The Navy and Army have chosen contract types they believe will allow their 
respective contracting methods to adjust or remain flexible to the constantly changing 
arena of environmental restoration. Both the CP AF and CPFF contracts allow an 
activity to adjust and react to changes whether it be regulatory or in the scope of 
work. Attempting to apply a fixed-price type contract in the field of environmental 
contracting would not allow the flexibility required by the Government and 
contractors. 
As indicated in Chapter III, the Navy and Army have chosen different cost-
reimbursement contract types. Although the two Services did not select the same 
basic type contract they both realized the importance of a cost-reimbursement 
contract. One of the primary concerns when using cost-reimbursement contracts is 
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how to best encourage cost conscious behavior by the contractor, consequently it 
should be one of the primary considerations when picking a type of cost-plus contract. 
The Navy determined that in the environmental restoration field, the relation-
ship between actual and targeted cost may or may not reflect the quality of a 
contractor's performance. When dealing with uncertainties like the ones discussed 
earlier, a project could easily come in well over the initial estimates. An overrun of 
this type does not necessarily mean that the contractor did not do a good job. In fact, 
a project could overrun its budget as a result of unexpected problems even if a 
contractor was doing an outstanding job of controlling costs. Under an incentive type 
contract (e.g., CPIF) the contractor would actually be penalized for these overruns. 
The Navy's CLEAN/RAC CPAF contract is designed to reward outstanding 
contractor performance based on subjective evaluation. Therefore, the Navy feels that 
the CP AF contract is the best suited contract to provide a real incentive for contractors 
working in the environmental cleanup arena. Since the contractor knows the fee he 
receives will be based on a subjective evaluation, he will endeavor to excel in those 
areas being evaluated. In this way the fee pool, none of which is guaranteed to the 
contractor, hopefully will act as a real incentive for excellence. For the reasons just 
discussed, the Navy believes the CP AF contract is best suited for environmental 
restoration. The Navy feels the CP AF contract both fits the unique nature of 
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problems environmental contracting is faced with and provides the best chance of 
maximizing the utility of the dollars spent in this area. 
The Army on the other hand, combats the lack of cost consciousness by 
contractors, inherent in the cost-reimbursement contracts, through the use of 
partnering in their TERC CPFF contracts. The Army feels that through the use of 
partnering one of its major disadvantage, low motivation for cost efficiency, can be 
controlled. With the Army and the contractor team working side-by-side, the team 
is able to focus on meeting the remediation requirements of the customer in the most 
effective and efficient manner available. 
The use of the TERC CPFF contract without partnering would make it more 
difficult to motivate the contractor to be cost conscious. The CPFF contract type was 
designed chiefly for use in research or exploratory development when the level of 
contractor effort required is unknown. Even though the requirements of an 
environmental remediation project often are not completely definable, the 
Government is going to have an approximate estimate of what the requirements are 
going to be and their costs. Without the use of partnering, the use of the CPFF 
contract would become much less efficient. 
2. Contracting Methods 
The Navy and Army have two different philosophical approaches in their 
environmental contracting methods. The Army uses a cradle-to-grave, one contractor 
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approach with the TERC contracts. lp contrast, the Navy uses a two contractor 
approach with the CLEAN contractor doing the design portion of the project and the 
RAC contractor actually performing the remediation. 
In the Navy's CLEAN/RAC contracts the focus is on an individual site, one 
contract for each restoration site. The Navy's contracting method is designed to be 
effective and efficient for one individual cleanup site. The Army on the other hand, 
directs their attention to providing the best contracting method possible for the 
environmental restoration problems as a whole. Rather than using the site-by-site 
approach the Navy uses, the Army views their environmental problems as one big 
environmental remediation site. A single TERC contract is designed to handle a 
multitude of sites simultaneously. 
3. Contracting Method Application 
The Navy and Army's contracting methods are well conceived and applied. 
Both Services realize their contracting methods are not designed to be the "one size 
fits all" method that encompasses all of their environmental remediation needs. 
The Army has carefully delineated the use for which the TERC contract 
methods are applied. As pointed out in Chapter III, the Army has detailed strict 
guidelines for the application of the TERC which prevents any dilution of its intended 
use. The ten guidelines or screening criteria used by the Army determine whether the 
site is nominated for remediation under a TERC contract. 
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Both the Navy and Army do not rule out the fact that CLEAN/RAC and TERC 
contracts may not always be the appropriate contract type for all situations. The 
Navy, however, does not have strict guidelines that enable them to determine whether 
a remediation project should be cleaned up with the CLEAN/RAC contracts. 
The Army has an extensive checklist that must be applied before a remediation 
project will be approved for cleanup via the TERC contracting method. The Navy on 
the other hand, has no checklist and all remediation sites are included for cleanup via 
the CLEAN/RAC contracting method, unless otherwise determined to be done by 
another contracting type. The Army cleanup site requires verification before a TERC 
contract can be used, as compared to the Navy, which specifies that there must be 
justification for a site not to be remediated through a CLEAN/RAC contract. 
4. Training 
The Navy and the Army both acknowledge the importance of training and 
education for personnel involved in their environmental contracting. The Army and 
Navy differ in their approaches for training their personnel. 
The Army's training is very rigid. Training for the Army must be 
accomplished both on the TERC's applicability of use and its actual procedures for 
use. Both of these categories of training are considered cornerstones to the project. 
These categories are required to be in place prior to any Army District receiving 
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authority to use the TERC contracting method. This training, as previously 
addressed, is not conducted in-house but by a private contractor. 
The Navy's training program is much more flexible. There is no prerequisite 
training or certification program that is required to be in place prior to the use of a 
CLEAN/RAC contract. The CLEAN/RAC contract training is incorporated into the 
command's professional training. The command's professional training is done 
periodically and varies from command to command on how much and how often 
environmental training is accomplished. As compared to the Army, where the TERC 
contracting method drives the training requirements, the Navy's CLEANIRAC 
training requirements are determined by the individual commands. 
5. Risk Mitigation 
The cost-reimbursement contract types used by the Navy and Army both shift 
the risk from the contractor to the Government, as compared to the total risk being 
placed on the contractor with the use of a FFP contract. Both Services, however, have 
procedures in place to mitigate or reduce the risk placed on the Government with their 
environmental remediation contracting. 
The Navy has managed the risks associated with their CLEAN/RAC contracts 
in a variety of ways. As pointed out in Chapters II and III, the scope of work required 
under CLEANIRAC contracts is complex and has a degree of uncertainty due to the 
nature of environmental remediation work. The Navy's top priority is quality or the 
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effective remediation of the site. These contracts shift the financial risk of unexpected 
conditions from the contractor to the Navy. The Navy's risk is controlled on their 
environmental contracts by incorporating a sophisticated cost and contract oversight 
program. 
The CLEAN/RAC contract provides the contractor with an incentive to 
complete the work in a quality, timely and cost effective manner. The contractor 
receives his profit entirely through a fee that is awarded based on an evaluation of 
their performance. Some evaluation criteria include areas such as cost control, timely 
execution, effective remediation techniques, and safety just to name a few. With the 
elimination of the base fee, the entire profit is based on the award fee increasing the 
contractor's risk of not receiving any profit. The exclusion of a base fee puts the 
contractor in a position such that a level IV performance would result in the contractor 
receiving only allowable costs incurred and no fee. Excluding a base fee does not 
mitigate the risk for the Government but increases the risk to the contractor of not 
receiving any fee. 
The Anny mitigates risk by various elements built into the TERC contracting 
method. Prior to its selection for use, the potential remediation project is thoroughly 
screened to ensure its validity as a TERC contracting method candidate. Both the 
screening process and the tiered approval process for use, helps to ensure the best 
contractual vehicle is being employed by the Army. The risk is further controlled 
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within the TERC contract via the Army's demand for standardized application and its 
means to ensure standardization. 
The Army delineates remediation project requirements in a manner similar to 
a performance specification, where the contractor is told what must be performed, not 
how to perform. A performance type of specification allows the contractor the 
flexibility to develop the best-value alternative for the Government and the 
Government to take advantage of the contractor's innovations. Coupled with the 
advantages of a performance-based specification, is the involvement of both Federal 
and state regulators in the design development process. Regulator involvement early 
on and throughout the design and construction process, ensures environmental legal 
requirements are being met. Regulator involvement reduces the Army's risk for 
potential cost and schedule overruns that could otherwise be expected if the regulatory 
checks were performed after the project has commenced. 
In the RFP, the Corps requests offerors to perform a sample project that 
represents similar conditions that may exist at the actual site involved. This sample 
project provides the Corps with unique insight into the respective offeror's 
understanding of the requirements, the cost-realism of the proposal and its unique 
approach to the remediation at hand. The sample project is also used as an indicator 
by the Army to identify where they may or may not be accepting risk with each 
offeror. 
79 
C. NAVY'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES 
At first glance, one may think that NA VF AC is not using the CP AF contract 
to its fullest potential. The researcher believes that the practice of using a "zero" base 
fee and potentially denying the contractor a chance to receive any fee for costs 
incurred would restrict the number of contractors willing to bid on CLEAN and RAC 
contracts. Even though risk is increased for the contractor, more than on a 
conventional CP AF contract, all seven EFD/EF As were satisfied with the number of 
contractors that bid on their contracts. The EFD/EF As also indicated that there is 
always a sufficient number of responsible offerors. One indication that contractors 
are generally doing a good job is that they are usually evaluated above 80 percent on 
the four evaluation criteria. 
It may also be thought that because the Navy uses the same four evaluation 
criteria and does not adjust their weighting, they would be unable to focus the 
contractor's attention on desired areas. Although there are only four evaluation 
criteria, the numerous subfactors under each encompasses almost any criterion a 
contracting officer would ever want to use. Because there are only four grades, a 
reduction in one will have a significant impact on the overall fee available. With only 
three remaining grades to absorb the affect of the low grade, the contractor's attention 
certainly can be focused on problem areas without adjusting the weights. The 
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researcher believes the evaluation criteria of the CP AF contract keeps the contract 
flexible by making all criteria important. 
NA VF AC's predetermined award fee of ten percent would appear to be 
inconsistent with the proper formation of an award fee contract, as this portion of the 
contract is usually negotiated. In actuality, the average grades (fee) given over the 
seven EFD/EFAs ranged from 8 to 8.5 percent. Even with the strict non-inflated 
grading, final profits are lower than the going-in fee often percent. 
The NA VF AC's CLEAN/RAC CP AF contracts may not be administered in a 
text book manner but for every unusual feature, the end results are similar to that of 
the conventional CP AF contract. The CLEAN/RAC contracts still provide the 
flexibility and motivational factors of a traditional CP AF contract. 
The researcher believes that the Navy's current environmental contracting 
method adequately but inefficiently allows the contractors to complete site cleanups. 
The researcher further believes the full advantages of the contract's award criteria are 
underutilized by the current contract methods in place. A more efficient and cost 
saving approach could be realized through the use of a single face to industry method. 
This would involved the use of one contract for the entire remediation project. 
It is felt by the researcher that the major areas of concern with the Navy's 
approach to environmental contracting stems from their interpretation of the Brooks 
AlE Act, which is covered next. 
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D. BROOKS ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ACT 
The researcher is under the belief that the Brooks AlE Act has some useful and 
relevant features but the Act could be improved upon. A section of the Act that could 
be amended is the requirement for the AlE contractor to be different than the 
contractor who actually does the construction. Having two different contractors for 
the remediation contract appears to be costing the Navy time and money. The RAC 
contractor is reconfinning the results of the CLEAN contractor who does not want to 
rely on misinformation and ends up redoing portions of the CLEAN contract. 
Essentially, the Act costs the Navy time and money requiring DoD to pay for parts of 
the AlE portion of the contract to be done twice. 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the Anny did a study comparing the time it took 
to complete a contract using two separate contractors as compared to their cradle-to-
grave approach. It was determined that the performance of work from time of award 
was reduced by six months or almost 30 percent when using the TERC contracting 
method. The RAC contractors are responsible for the actual cleanup and cannot 
afford, schedule or cost wise, to come across numerous unknowns that were 
overlooked in the AlE portion of the contract. The work completed during the 
CLEAN contract appears to be an excessive expenditure of time and money because 
the RAC contractors typically do their own assessment of the remediation project. 
Working with the same contractor throughout a project would allow a "cradle-
to-grave" approach with one firm. Using one contractor would help pinpoint liability, 
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avoid the complications ofwork handoffbetween contractors and save considerable 
time and effort due to resolicitation between phases. With one contractor, there is 
only one learning curve whether it be in dealing with the local or state regulations for 
a particular site or in the actual remediation. 
The proper application of partnering will help keep in check the possibility of 
the requirements being inflated during the design phase. With the partnering 
approach the Army uses, the opportunity for inflated requirements is reduced 
significantly. 
On the other hand, one may have reason to support the Brooks AlE Act. The 
Navy, along with Congress, believes that two different contractors involved in the 
design and remediation of a site provides a needed check and balance system for the 
remediation project. The second contractor reviews the AlE portion of the contract 
helping to identify any mistakes or inaccuracies in the project. The earlier these 
inconsistencies are identified in the project, the easier and less expensive the 
corrections will be to make. 
The Brooks AlE Act also supports a broad industrial base. Having two 
contractors for a project vice one, enables DoD to keep a broader supplier base. A 
broader supplier base enhances competition and increases the number of competent 
potential offerers. A broad supplier base also helps keep costs to a minimum by 
increasing competition. 
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Although there are some supporters of the Brooks AlE Act, the researcher 
believes that with the Government and contractor working side by side, it provides a 
system of checks and balances, eliminating the need for this portion of the Brooks 
AlE Act altogether. While partnering and the Brooks AlE Act do not agree on a 
specific contracting method, each side represents a position that would keep inflated 
design requirements to a minimum. One possible alternative to help keep design 
requirements to a minimum is to develop a contractor teaming approach. A teaming 
approach would still involve two separate contractors but the RAC contractor would 
be working side by side with the CLEAN contractor from the start of the AlE portion 
of the project. It could be argued that a teaming approach could reduce the cost 
required by the RAC contractor to reconfirm portions ofthe CLEAN contract and also 
ease the transitional difficulties experienced between the CLEAN/RAC contractors. 
E. ARMY'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES 
This section will analyze the Army's application of its environmental 
contracting methods. The Army has incorporated many of the key features identified 
in DoD's acquisition reform initiatives by encouraging innovation, performance 
specifications, partnering!IPTs, long term contractor/Government relationships, 
streamlining of the acquisition process, and training and education. 
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The TERC RFP requests offerors to perform a sample project that represents 
the conditions that may exist on the actual site at which remediation efforts are 
required. Each offeror's project provides the Army with unique insight into the 
respective offeror's understanding of the requirements of the situation, its unique 
approach to the remediation at hand and the cost-realism of the proposal. 
Although the sample projects can provide the Army with useful information, 
as stated above, one may argue its actual benefits. Can one determine that just 
because a potential offeror accurately assessed the sample project, that they have the 
resources and trained personnel to follow through on the project? A clear drawback 
of the sample project is that it raises the potential contractor's bid and proposal costs, 
contradicting DoD's initiative to lower these costs. 
As pointed out in Chapter IV, the Army's remediation project requirements are 
written in a manner similar to a performance specification, where the contractor is 
told what must be performed, not how to perform. This type of specification allows 
the contractor the flexibility to possibly develop a remediation alternative for the 
Government that has not previously been thought of by the Army. 
Coupled with the advantages of a performance-based specification, is the 
involvement of both Federal and state regulators in the design and development 
process. Early regulator involvement ensures that environmental legal requirements 
are met early and not after remediation as already commenced. Early identification 
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of potential regulatory problems reduces the risk of possible cost and schedule over-
runs that would be expected if the regulatory checks were performed after the actual 
cleanup has started. 
It may be argued that early involvement from regulators could actually deter 
the use of innovative ideas or technology initiated by the potential offerers. 
Regulators may be more concerned about having a new innovative idea go awry, 
causing possible increased damage to the environment, than they are concerned about 
possible cost and schedule savings. Regulators are less apt to approve these new 
innovative ideas, with the belief that if a new idea does not work it may cause more 
harm to the environment than already exists. 
It is the belief of this researcher that despite the potential for reduced support 
for new and innovative ideas by the regulators, it is better to confront problems early 
on in a project. Confronting probl~ms early on, over the long run, will save the 
Government time and money. 
The Army has established a sound partnering relationship with the customer, 
the contractor, and Federal and state regulators. The Army realizes that commitment 
is the key element to a partnering relationship. With the basic element of trust 
between the contractor and the Government, it is the researcher's belief that the results 
will be effective communication, demonstrated cost and schedule savings. 
The TERC contracting method enable the Army to realize cost and schedule 
savings up-front in the contracting process during the solicitation and award phases. 
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The single contractual arrangement of the TERC provides the Army with one full-
service contract for every remediation project versus traditional contracting methods 
which require two contracts (AlE and actual cleanup) per project. It appears that 
significant cost and schedule savings in the solicitation process alone may be realized 
by the Government as a result of TERC contracts. 
The use of only one delivery order per project versus one delivery order per 
remediation site on each project, facilitates contract administration since all the work 
is at one site. The work can be coordinated through one contractor by using the same 
requirements instead of multiple contractors working under different contracting 
instruments. Also, the single delivery order facilitates contract closeout. By the use 
of a single delivery order, neither the contractor nor the Government is distracted by 
continuing efforts under other delivery orders once each project is complete. Under 
the single delivery order concept, once all projects are complete, no continued 
performance is required and the delivery order can be closed. 
An argument against the use of a single contractor may also be presented. The 
use of a single contractor for a multiple site project keeps smaller contractors from 
successfully bidding on a project of this size. Eliminating small contractors from 
bidding on contracts decreases competition and may increase costs to the 
Government. The small contractor may not have enough competent personnel and 
resources that is required for a multiple sites project. The small contractor may be 
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unable to spread their resources to multiple sites, hindering them from meeting the 
requirements of a large project. In looking at the above suggestions, from the 
researcher's analysis, it is evident that the benefits of a single point of contact far 
outweigh its disadvantages. 
Although the Army has boilerplate acquisition plans and RFPs, once a project 
is chosen to be a TERC, these controls are adjusted to conform to the requirements 
ofthe project. The adjustment of contracts allows the TERC contracting method to 
remain flexible prior to award and also maintains that the contractor has flexibility to 
adjust quickly to the possible unknowns that they may come across while executing 
the contract. 
The mandatory training required by the Army helps ensure that the 
Government properly administers the TERC contracts. With the added administrative 
burden of a cost-reimbursement contract, it is essential that the Government have 
well-trained acquisition personnel. The added cost of the training may be more than 
returned if a TERC contract is properly administered. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that training personnel to be innovative 
may be very difficult. Educating a person to be creative is a difficult task because 
there is no Clear cut set of rules or guidelines to follow. It is also very expensive and 
time consuming to keep personnel current and up to date on the constantly changing 
innovations and regulations involved in environmental remediation. 
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Despite the concerns one may have over the costs of training personnel to be 
innovative, the researcher feels the benefits gained by training personnel far outweigh 
its drawbacks. 
The Army appears to have done a superb job of incorporating several of the 
acquisition reform initiatives available today. The cost and schedule savings are 
apparent and should continue to grow as the contractor/Government adversarial 
atmosphere is reduced by the partnering relationship. It is the researcher's belief that 
cost and schedule savings will also be realized by the new and innovative approaches 
that will appear as the results of unrestrictive design approach which the Army has 
taken. 
F. SUMMARY 
The researcher's analysis discovered two very different philosophical 
approaches to environmental contracting. Several contrasting points of interest 
between the Navy's use of the CLEAN/RAC contract type can be compared to the 
Army's use of the cradle-to-grave approach. 
The Navy uses a two-contractor approach called the CLEAN/RAC contract. 
In the CLEAN contract, the contractor will execute the design portion of the project 
and the RAC contractor actually performs the remediation of the contract. 
In contrast, the Army uses the cradle-to-grave approach implementing a TERC 
contract. In the cradle-to-grave approach a single contractor completes all facets of 
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the environmental remediation which includes the AlE portion of the contract and the 
actual cleanup. 
From the researcher's analysis, one may infer that when DoD is required to do 
more with less, the Army appears to be aggressively heading in the right direction. 
Through the use of innovative ideas, streamlined processes and long-term 
nonadversarial contractor relationships, the Army is taking environmental contracting 
into the next century. 
This analysis has highlighted some of the contracting methods that the DoD 
uses to perform in its environmental remediation cleanup efforts. Chapter VI 
provides conclusions, recommendations, and answers to the primary and subsidiary 
research questions. 
90 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis was to determine what are the feasible contracting 
methods for administering environmental contracting and is it possible to have one 
method so DoD can provide a single face to industry. To explore this subject, the 
researcher reviewed environmental laws and regulation, DoD's environmental 
contracting guidance and interviewed personnel from both Government and industry. 
The researcher analyzed the two contracting methods presently in use by DoD. This 
chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis, offers recommendations, answers the 
primary and subsidiary research questions, and suggests areas for further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Navy and Army realize the importance of flexibility in their 
choice of environmental contracting methods. 
Changing technology and regulations coupled with the inability to 
accurately define requirements necessitate a contract type that can quickly adapt to 
change. The Navy and Army have chosen contract types that will allow their 
contracting methods to adjust or take form to the ever changing field of environmental 
remediation. Even though the Navy and Army have selected different types of cost-
reimbursement contracts, both realize the flexibility built into contracts of this type. 
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The Navy's CPAF contract and the Army's CPFF contract both fit the unique nature 
of problems environmental restoration is confronted with. 
2. The Navy and Army do not interpret all environmental regulations 
in the same manner. 
The different interpretation of environmental regulations has caused the 
Navy and Army to take separate philosophical approaches in their environmental 
contracting methods. The Navy does not allow the design and the actual cleanup 
portion of an environmental remediation project to be done by the same contractor. 
In contrast, the Army employs a cradle-to-grave approach whereby a single contractor 
can do both, the design portion and the actual remediation. As pointed out in Chapter 
IV, the Navy's contracting method requires additional cost and time to administer two 
contracts vice the one contract required in the Army. 
3. The Navy and Army employ different procedures for monitoring 
the contractor's performance. 
The Navy oversees their environmental contractors in an evaluation or 
assessment like atmosphere as compared to the Army who monitors their contractor 
in a side-by-side or partnering manner. This difference is caused primarily by the 
nature of the different contract types. The Navy's CP AF contract is designed to 
provide initial guidance to the contractor and disengage until the end of the evaluation 
period. The Army's CPFF contract and the use ofpartnering allows the contractor 
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and Government to work through problems and decisions together. This eliminates 
the contractors having to wait until the end of an evaluation period to confirm whether 
their approach is satisfactory. 
4. The Navy and the Army both understand that environmental 
contracting is an evolving field and improvements gained from new technology 
and past lessons learned are a must. 
The Navy and Army have the right approach in that remedial 
contracting is an evolving process that must be continually improved. In order to 
improve on these contracting methods, the Army and Navy are in agreement that they 
must continue to facilitate its evolutionary process of adopting lessons learned from 
previously executed contracts into future generations of CLEAN/RAC and TERC 
contracts. As pointed out in Chapter IV, both Services have experienced time delays 
and cost increases through .mistakes or less efficient methods in which they have 
administered environmental remediation contracts. This same evolutionary process 
can also be realized by incorporating new technology and remediation procedures into 
their respective contracting methods. 
5. The Army appears to have effectively integrated some of the tools 
emphasized by acquisition reform in environmental remediation contracting. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the Army has streamlined the acquisition 
process through the use of only one contractor. They have encouraged innovation 
with the use of performance specifications (design) and the adoption of sample 
93 
projects. The Army also promotes long term contractor/Government relationships 
and stresses the importance of training/education. Incorporation of these initiatives 
appear to be saving DoD both time and money now and should continue to do so in 
the future. 
6. The Navy and the Army have different approaches to training their 
personnel. 
Though the Navy and Army have taken different approaches to training 
their environmental contracting workforce, they both agree that training and education 
are of the utmost importance. The Navy's training is very flexible and there is no 
certification program, prerequisite education or training that must be completed prior 
awarding and administering CLEAN/RAC contracts. The Navy's training is 
incorporated into the Command's professional development training. The Army's 
training on the other hand is very structured. Specific training must have already been 
accomplished before a remediation site can be considered eligible ·for a TERC 
contract. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Army's TERC contracting method should be considered for 
adoption by all DoD Services. 
The TERC contract represents a new and innovative method of 
remediation contracting. This contracting method provides a single face to industry 
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and provides some continuity between the different Services. The TERC contract 
provides the most streamlined and efficient method available for environmental 
contracting, which in tum yields the most time and cost savings. The Navy should 
consider this contracting method by organizing a steering committee to evaluate the 
facets of TERC contracting that could be adopted. The committee should be 
comprised ofboth Navy and Army technical and acquisition proficient personnel. All 
Government Services that are involved with environmental contracting should be 
afforded an opportunity to participate in this committee. Regulator activities should 
also be encouraged to attend. 
2. To assist in the implementation of the above mentioned contracting 
method, the Brooks AlE Act should be amended to permit one contractor to 
complete both the AlE and remediation effort. 
This recommendation would allow a "cradle-to-grave" approach. As 
apparent with the TERC contracts, the advances that have been made in partnering 
make this requirement of the Act no longer necessary. The above mentioned change 
should be incorporated into the FAR. The Army and Navy are not in agreement on 
the interpretation of this Act and therefore are not in agreement on the most beneficial 
contracting method to be used for environmental remediation. Interpretation of the 
Brooks AlE Act was made at the Secretarial level, however, if these changes are 
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incorporated into the FAR, greater flexil?ility in establishing a single face to industry 
for environmental contracting could be achieved. 
3. DoD should develop a single environmental training program for 
use by all Services. 
The development of a single environmental training program will ease 
some of the difficulties that will be experienced with the implementation of a single 
contracting method. Keeping a single training program accurately updated with 
current regulatory changes or technological advances will be made easier. The 
researcher suggests that DoD should formulate a single training certification program 
that will require an activity to be fully certified before any environmental contracting 
can be initiated. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question: What are the feasible contracting methods for 
administering environmental contracting? 
There are two feasible contracting methods for administering environmental 
contracting. The first is a cradle-to-grave approach that has the same contractor doing 
the AlE portion of the project along with the actual cleanup segment of the project. 
The second method requires the AlE and the cleanup portions of the project to be 
executed by separate contractors. Each method is the result of an interpretation of the 
96 
Brooks AlE Act which requires the AlE portion of a construction contract to be 
completed by a contractor other than the contractor actually doing the construction. 
2. Subsidiary Question 1: What contracting methods are actually 
being used by DoD? 
The DoD presently uses the two methods mentioned in the primary question. 
The Army uses a TERC contract which is a cradle-to-grave approach. The Navy uses 
a two-contractor method with the CLEAN contractor doing the AlE portion and the 
RAC contractor actually doing the remediation portion of the project. 
3. Subsidiary Question 2: What are the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each of these contracting methods? 
The award-fee part of the CLEAN/RAC CPAF contract provides greater 
motivation to the contractor by better controlling their remediation efforts. The CP AF 
contract allows flexibility to be built into CLEAN/RAC contracts by allowing the 
Navy to change the weighting of an evaluation criterion. As with the CP AF contracts 
there are administrative costs associated with this type contract. 
The Navy's interpretation of the Brooks AlE Act makes the CLEAN/RAC 
contracts more lengthy, with a redundancy built into them. A lot of the work 
accomplished with the CLEAN contracts are repeated again in the respective RAC 
contract. The administrative work is considerably greater with the CLEAN/RAC 
contract as compared to the Army's TERC contract. Early studies indicate that the 
TERC contracts can be completed in almost two thirds the time of a CLEAN/RAC 
contract. 
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The Army's TERC contracts have a number of innovative factors built into 
them. The Army requires the potential awardee to explain how they would cleanup 
a sample project presented to them, similar to the project they were bidding on. The 
reply to the sample project allows the Army to assess the contractor's understanding 
of the requirements associated with a sample project. 
As similar to a performance specification, another innovative feature of the 
Army's TERC contract is the design portion. The TERC does not give details on how 
to accomplish the remediation, it only provides what the scope of work entails. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph the TERC contract can be 
accomplished in two thirds of the time and with less administrative burden because 
there is only one prime contractor as compared to the two required in the 
CLEAN/RAC contracts. An additional benefit is that since there is only one 
contractor the additional time and effort required to bring the second contractor up to 
equal project knowledge of the first contractor is eliminated. 
The training that is required before a TERC contract can be administered 
should significantly reduce the chance that it will be poorly administered. The TERC 
contract, as with all cost-plus contracts, requires more time and manpower to 
administrator than the contracts of the fixed-price type. 
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4. Subsidiary Question 3: What are the possibilities that partnering 
should or has been implemented in DoD environmental restoration 
contracting? 
The Army has successfully implemented the use of partnering in their TERC 
contracts. Partnering is directly responsible for two of the most critical aspects of a 
TERC contract, project concurrency and project flexibility. Partnering assists in the 
clear defmition and interpretation of requirements and subsequently the development 
of methods for monitoring and evaluating the completion of requirements. 
5. Subsidiary Question 4: Is there a single established contract type 
that all branches of the Services can use to provide an integrated 
single face to industry? 
Statements of work in environmental contracting vary from accurate detailed 
descriptions to the inability to define the scope of work. Because there is such a 
variance in how accurate the scope of work can be it is very difficult to pinpoint a 
particular contract type that will satisfy every situation covered in environmental 
contracting. The DoD needs to refrain from forcing a particular contract on the 
contractors. The lesson has already been learned with FFP contracts in the early 80's. 
It is feasible though to have one contracting method to provide a single face 
to industry with the use of the Army's "cradle-to-grave" approach as in the TERC 
contracts. 
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6. Subsidiary Question 5: To what extent should guidance regarding 
the contracting of environmental restoration be implemented into 
the FAR? 
The interpretation of the Brooks AlE Act for both the Navy and the Army was 
determined at the Secretarial level which normally would be a high enough level for 
a decision of this magnitude. Because the Act is interpreted differently it is the 
primary cause for each to have separate contracting methods. In today's acquisition 
world, the Government is often attempting to allow some flexibility of the 
interpretation of its regulations but in order to provide a single face to industry one 
DoD interpretation must be realized. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of this thesis, other areas which appeared to merit additional 
study were identified. Addressing these issues were beyond the scope of this thesis; 
they are presented for consideration and potential future research. 
1. An in-depth comparative analysis of the CLEAN/RAC and TERC 
contracts to determine the time and cost savings between the two 
contracting methods. 
2. Is it effective to have all DoD agencies contracting for environmental 
cleanup? Should just a few of the agencies administer contracts for all 
the sites? For example, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) could 
administer all environmental contracts for the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. 
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3. A cost/benefit analysis on the effects of the Brooks AlE Act. What 
additional cost (time or money) and benefits are being realized because 
of this Act? 
101 
102 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Kandaras, Cheryl, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary ofNavy (Installations 
and Environment) before the Subcommittee on the House National Security 
Committee on Environmental Programs, March 24, 1995. 
2. Naval Energy and Environment Support Activity (NEESA), "Navy's 
Commanding Officers Guide to Environmental Compliances," p. 4, January 
1991. 
3. Powers, Mary, "Government Spending: Environmental Cleanup; Cost 
Control," ENR, ISSN: 0891-9526, Vol. 230, Issue 14, p. 16, Apri115, 1993. 
4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Management Plan: Total Environ-
mental Restoration Contracts (TERC), September 17, 1993. 
5. General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, Committee on Government 
Operations, House ofRepresentative, Hazardous Waste, Improvement needed 
in DoD's Contracting System for Disposal of Waste, p. 2, Apri11995. 
6. Ray, Richard, House ofRepresentatives, "Environmental Restoration and Base 
Closing," The Military Engineer, No. 538, p. 11, September-October 1990. 
7. Hook, Henry, GM13, Deputy Director Craney Island Fuel Depot, Norfolk, 
VA, phone interviews with researcher, October 1995. 
8. Rapp, L., NA VF AC Environmental Division, Atlantic Division, Norfolk, VA, 
phone interview with researcher, October 10, 1995. 
9. Dobler, D., Burt, D., Lee, L., Purchasing and Material Management, McGraw 
Hill: New York, NY, 1990. 
10. Smith, Charles, Contracting for Engineering and Design Services in the 
Environmental Restoration Field, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, December 1991. 
103 
11. Pawlisch, James, Director Environmental Division, Southwest Division 
NA VFAC San Diego, CA, phone interview with researcher, February 20, 
1996. 
12. The New Palgrave, A Dictionary ofEconomics, Vol. 3, The Stockton Press, 
p. 549, 1987. 
13. Ashhurst, K., An Evaluation of Risk and Cost Contracts for Construction 
Procurements, Thesis, Florida Institute of Technology, p. 3, November 1983. 
14. Sherman, Stanley, Government Procurement Management, Wordcrafters 
Publication, Germantown, MD, 1991. 
15. Rodger, John, Director of CLEAN contracts, EFD Southwest, San Diego, CA, 
phone interviews with researcher, February 23,1996. 
16. Meadows, Mark, Director Environmental Division, EFA West, San Bruno, 
CA, personal interview with researcher, February 23, 1996. 
17. Lee, Martin, Summaries of Environmental Laws Administered by 
Environmental Protection Agency, CRS Report for Congress, 93-53 ENR, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, p. 23, January 
14,1993. 
18. Schumacher, Aileen, A Guide to Hazardous Material Management, Quorum 
Books: New York, NY, 1988. 
19. Banaji, Darius, Contracting Methods and Management System Within the U.S. 
NayY's Installation Restoration Program, Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, September 1993. 
20. U.S. Code of Federal Regulation, Environmental Policy, 40 CFR U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 40 CFR 300.1, 1994. 
21. Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) Annual Report to 
Congress for Fiscal Year 1994, U.S. Department of Defense, February 1994. 
22. Lombardo, R., "Dealing with Environmental Regulators," Naval Civil 
Engineer, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, p. 28, Winter/Spring 1993. 
104 
23. Chief ofNaval Operations (CNO), NaVY Installation Restoration IR Manual, 
May 1988. 
24. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, CLEAN Contract Manual P-1070, 
Alexandria, VA, July 1992. 
25. Debello, J., Director ofEnvironmental Contracting, EFA Ches, Chesapeake, 
VA, phone interview with researcher, February 12, 1996. 
26. Contract Incentive Handout, Naval Postgraduate School course MN 3303, p. 
31. 
27. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1996. 
28. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, RAC Contract Manual P-1092, 
Alexandria, VA, October 1995. 
29. Rule, Dave, Director ofEnvironmental Contracting, EFD North, Philadelphia, 
PA, phone interview with researcher, February 12, 1996. 
30. Hart, Neil, Chief Procurement Officer, Enserch Environmental Corporation, 
Seattle WA, phone interview with researcher, February 23, 1996. 
31. House, Mark, Environmental Analysis, International Technology Corporation, 
Virginia Beach, VA, phone interview with researcher, February· 12, 1996. 
32. Brenal, Jerry, Director of Environmental Contracting, EFA Midwest, Great 
Lakes, MI, phone interview with researcher, February 12, 1996. 
33. Hearn, Emmett, Federal Acquisition and Contract Management, Hearn 
Associates, 1992. 
34. Schumitz, Robert, Risk Mitigation Techniques Employed in the Remediation 
Contracting Process for the Environmental Cleanup ofF ort Ord. California, 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1995. 
105 
35. Haskell, John, Procurement Analysis Contracting Division, U.S. Army Corps 
ofEngineering, Omaha District, Omaha, NE, phone interview with researcher, 
August-September I996. 
36. Ijames, Ruth Anne, Chief of Contracts Division, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineering, Sacramento District, Sacramento, CA, phone interview with 
researcher, July 30, I996. 
37. Gilles, Sharon, Chief of Environmental Restoration, USAF, San Antonio, TX, 
phone interview with researcher, July I, I996. 
38. McClarey, Mark, System Analysis, General Accounting Office (GAO), 
Denver, CO, phone interviews with researcher, August-September I996. 
39. Sauliner, Gerri, Office of Environmental Restoration, Center for Environ-
mental Excellence, San Antonio, TX, phone interview with researcher, August 
I, I996. 
40. Rubin, Debra, "Military Rivals Square Off Over Cleanup Contracting 
Approaches," ENR Journal, Vol. 234, Issue 9, pp. 47-49, March 6, I995. 
41. Lewin, James, "The Brooks Architect-Engineer Act: Promoting Quality in 
Federal Procurement," Topical Issues in Procurement Series (TIPS), Vol. 5, 
No. I2, December I994. 
106 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ......................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange ................. 2 
U.S. Army Logistics Management College 
Fort Lee, VA 22134-5027 
4. Dr. David V. Lamm, (Code SM!Lt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
5. Professor Mark W. Stone, (Code SM/St) ....................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
6. LCDR Barry R. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
21 Brouse Rd. 
Norfolk, NY 13667 
107 
